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SUMMARY 
 
 This dissertation contributes to the definition of an analytical framework for the 
study of optimal jurisdictional size for local service delivery. We argue that the standard 
economics framework for the analysis of optimal jurisdictional size importantly neglects 
individual preferences for political accountability. Our theoretical model shows that once 
we take into account such preferences, the optimal jurisdictional size for the provision of 
local public goods is smaller than in the standard model. We obtain empirical evidence to 
support our hypothesis from a sample of 197 countries. Our results show that, in fact, 
demand for political accountability leads to higher jurisdictional fragmentation both in 
terms of greater number of jurisdictions and smaller average population per jurisdiction. 
In addition, a meta-analysis of the empirical contributions to the study of economies of 
scale in the provision of local services shows that the economies of scale expected from 
service provision to larger jurisdictional sizes may not be present except for a handful of 
local services, and limited to relatively small population sizes. The results of the meta-
analysis signal moderately increasing to constant returns to scale in the provision of 
traditional local services. In light of these results, we argue that forced jurisdictional 
consolidation programs across the world justified by perceptions of excessive 
jurisdictional fragmentation, or by the expectation of large expenditure savings due to 
economies of scale may have been, thus, erroneously designed. From a policy 
perspective, multi-layered institutional frameworks for service delivery (including 
cooperation and privatization among other options) may allow targeting available 
efficiency gains more efficiently than consolidation. 
CHAPTER 1  
OPTIMAL JURISDICTIONAL SIZE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION:  
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE STANDARD THEORY 
“…the sizes of national states (or countries) are due to trade-offs between the benefits of 
size and the costs of heterogeneity of preferences over public goods and policies provided 
by government.” (Alberto Alesina & Spolaore, 2003) 
 
1.1 On the optimal size of local government 
 
Standard economic theory (Oates, 1972) defines the problem of optimal jurisdictional 
size in the provision of services as consisting of two main tradeoffs. First, the trade off 
existing between the welfare gains expected from smaller governments (better placed to 
match expenditure allocation to local preferences) and the economies of scale (or 
associated lower average costs) expected from the delivery of services at larger 
jurisdictional sizes. On that basis, equilibrium would be reached when the difference 
between the marginal welfare gains from more efficient provision and the marginal costs 
derived from foregone economies of scale is maximized.  
The second critical tradeoff determining optimal jurisdictional size is that between the 
closer accountability offered by smaller governments to their citizens and the higher 
management, administrative, and information costs associated with multiple jurisdictions 
for service delivery. In truth, although Oates (1972) presents this disjunctive as a second 
trade off in his discussion, the latter trade off can be taken as a corollary to the first. 
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Management and administration costs can readily be assumed as part of the service 
production costs and, similarly, political accountability is a requirement to ensure citizens 
preferences are reflected in local public expenditure, increasing overall welfare. 
Equilibrium is reached in Oates' (1972) model when the welfare gains associated with 
improved tailoring of service provision to citizens’ preferences are maximized relative to 
the costs of production.  
The analytical framework proposed by Oates for the identification of the optimal 
jurisdictional size for local government provision departs from the consideration that the 
individual consumer’s surplus is reduced when a collective decision must be taken to 
determine the level of public service provided to the jurisdiction. It is most likely that the 
level of the public good G provided will be either above or below the level that would 
have maximized individual utility thus the loss of consumer surplus incurred1. The social 
welfare cost of such a collective decision on the level of G would be equal to the sum of 
the individual losses of welfare in Oates (1972) model.   
Because we believe an individual consumer surplus approach is intuitive and helpful let 
us assume, following Baleiras (2001), that the representative individual derives utility 
from the consumption of a private good (y) and a pure public good (G) according to the 
following quasi-linear utility function 
U(yj, G) = yj + u(G) 
where yj is the individual’s consumption of the private good, and G is the quantity of 
public good produced. If the utility obtained from the consumption of the public good is 
                                                            
1 Presumably for everyone except the median voter. 
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twice  continuously differentiable (U’ >0 and U’’<0), then changes to the goods’ prices 
are reflected in changes to the individual’s utility.  With a quasi-linear utility function, the 
change in consumer’s surplus reflects the utility impact of a price variation. The social 
welfare change is the result of the summation across all individuals of the changes in 
consumer surplus (Baleiras, 2001).   
In the case of a single, representative consumer, he would choose to consume the amount 
of public good that maximizes U(yj, G). However, when two or more consumers are 
considered and the amount of public good provided is the result of a “collective decision” 
(i.e. direct democracy, representative political systems, etc.), then there will be a welfare 
loss associated to a level of public good provision that may not be optimal to any of the 
individuals. For some consumers, the level of G provided will be below their individual 
optimal level and for other individuals it will be over their optimal level. Thus, we can 
think of the cost curve C representing a “collective agreement” for public service delivery 
(see Figure 1). Following Alesina & Spolaore (2003) linear uni-dimensional model, if we 
note G*i as the individual’s preferred level of G, we assume that the loss of welfare 
derived from the provision of a collective level of G is the same whether G exceeds or is 
below G*i by the same amount. If G is below the individual’s preferred level, there is a 
missing input in the individual utility function. For levels of G above the preferred 
individual level, the increase in tax price decreases the utility of the public good2.   
                                                            
2  This is for instance the case of elderly couples without school-age children. Such 
couples have no preferences for public education expenditure (finances traditionally with 
property tax revenues in the USA), except to the extent that good schools improve 
property values of their districts. Beyond that point, too much public education turns into 
a loss of utility.  
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Should the decision on the level of public good provision be taken via popular vote (i.e. 
direct democracy), then, provided certain assumptions are met, we would expect the 
preferences of the median voter to decisive. However, there are other “collective decision 
mechanisms” available, such as representative democracy, whereby the incentives and 
preferences of political representatives would also come to play, to determine such level 
of provision.  
On the other hand, the average cost of production of the public good may be reduced as 
more individuals share it; this will be so if we assume the good is produced with 
economies of scale over a certain range. Such economies of scale may be derived from 
declining average fixed production costs over larger production ranges, or from the 
efficiency gains obtained from specialization in production that may only be efficient 
when output reaches a certain level. Therefore, we would expect the benefits derived 
from cost reduction (represented by the curve B in Figure 1) to rise sharply once 
additional individuals are added to the pool of beneficiaries, as corresponds to a convex 
relaionship. The marginal increase in welfare derived from the addition of a new 
individual decreases eventually until it levels off. Above an equilibrium size of N*, the 
sum of individual welfare losses from enjoying a G that is above or below individuals’ 
optimal levels may completely offset the cost-saving advantages from economies of 
scale. As Oates puts it, as “group size increases, the influence of any particular individual 
on his own level of consumption of the good diminishes (1972; p.41)”.  
Thus, the optimal jurisdictional size (in population terms) is defined, in the conventional 
Oates’ model as the government size where the difference between the marginal social 
benefit obtained from average cost reduction and the increased marginal social cost 
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derived from a level of G that does not match the individuals’ optimal choice is 
maximized.   
 
 
N* N** 
N 
B, C 
C 
B 
 
B’ 
Figure 1. Optimal Jurisdictional Size 
 
The simplicity of the conventional model is appealing. It includes in a uni-dimensional 
analysis both the pattern of economies of scale in the benefit curve and the losses in 
allocative efficiency derived from the collective determination of the level of public 
good. Baleiras (2001) shows this optimal jurisdictional size is Pareto efficient.  
An important corollary of Oates’ analysis is that different public goods achieve different 
optimal jurisdictional sizes of provision. Thus, a federal (or otherwise decentralized) 
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system of government whereby public goods and services are delivered by different 
levels of government would allow maximizing allocative efficiency. 
The assumptions behind this model include the need for a constant and immobile 
population, zero transaction costs for collective decision-making and that the financing of 
the public good provision be efficiency-neutral (i.e. lump sum taxation). However, the 
assumptions of the model can be relaxed to account for these issues. 
Should the public good be subject to important externalities, the benefit curve may be 
underestimating the social benefits accruing from the good’s provision. This would be the 
case, for instance, of a hospital providing services to patients that reside outside its 
jurisdiction. Estimating social benefits only on the basis of the population of the 
jurisdiction hosting the hospital would underestimate overall impact and “catchment” 
area of benefits. In this example, the model would thus suggest that larger jurisdictional 
sizes are required in order to internalize the benefits/losses caused by the provision of this 
public good and match the jurisdiction with the benefit area to avoid under provision. 
This matching between different public goods with different benefit areas is known as 
perfect correspondence in Oates (1972)3. The analysis of the welfare implications of 
“discrepancies between the boundaries of a public good and those of the jurisdiction” are 
discussed in Olson (1969), who already points to the need to establish a wide range of 
government institution to reach what he calls “fiscal equivalence”. The social benefit 
                                                            
3 Several different other terms have been used in the literature to denote this process of 
matching jurisdictional size to the benefit area of the provision of a public good. Breton 
(1965) used “perfect mapping” to conceptualize this issue. Stigler (1957) called it “fiscal 
correspondence” in his study of the responsibilities of different levels of government in 
the USA.  
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curve would shift outwards, increasing the optimal population size for provision to N** 
(Figure 1 above).  
The effect of relaxing the assumption of an immobile population is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, mobility may reduce the cost of smaller jurisdictions if consumers are 
efficiently sorted among different jurisdictions, but on the other hand, it may subject 
public good provision to congestion costs. This would lead to the implementation of tolls 
and charges for public good consumption as developed in the economic theory of clubs 
by Buchanan (1965). Lastly, the assumption of zero transactions costs for collective 
decision making, should it be relaxed in Oates model, may lead to larger jurisdictions and 
fewer governments in order to minimize the cost of government and of inter-
governmental fiscal relations. The presumption is that transaction costs will be smaller 
for larger jurisdictions due to economies of scope that reduce the cost of policy 
coordination and public good delivery Boyne (1992). This argument, as we will see, does 
not seem to be backed up by empirical evidence in government cost savings after 
jurisdictional consolidation (Bish, 2001).  
Oates (1972) argues that this analysis should guide policy makers and academics in 
answering which level of government should provide the good (i.e. determine the level of 
consumption), but that the production function of a particular good may indicate the 
desirability of contracting with another local government, a higher government level, or 
even privatizing the production of the good. The distinction between allocative and 
productive efficiency is thus outlined clearly by Oates. Interestingly, he briefly mentions 
that privatization or contracting out to other governments may “permit a different type of 
resolution of this trade off problem”. That, for some public goods, joint production or 
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privatization may allow enjoying the benefits of decentralized provision (differing levels 
per government) and the cost advantages from economies of scale. Thus, the basic model 
does offer important insights as to the efficient institutional set-up that should 
accommodate the provision of the public good. However, this option is not fully 
developed.  
Assuming that the cost function of a generic public good shows increasing returns to 
scale, being thus U-shaped although not necessarily symmetrical, a local government 
may find itself unable to take advantage of the economies of scale due to reduced size 
(i.e. and lack of investment capacity for instance), as in point A in Figure 2. 
 
 
B 
A 
C 
Q’  Q* 
Q 
LAC 
Figure 2.  Long-run U-shaped Average Cost Curve (LAC) 
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A larger government size would allow reaching the productive capacity required to move 
to B, where the full extent of the economies of scale is taken advantage of. The 
investment required to produce the amount of public good required may be prohibitively 
high for a small local government, and thus it may find, if it decided to produce the good 
by itself, that it would be located at point Q’ in Figure 2.A, a sub-optimal state.  
 
Oates’ model may arguably suggest that a larger jurisdictional size would allow reaching 
B and benefiting from the cost savings derived. Perhaps logically, resort to local 
governments’ consolidation, anchored in the assumption of available economies of scale, 
has dominated jurisdictional reform around the world in search for more efficient local 
public sectors. As we have seen, once the main assumptions of the model are relaxed, the 
model predicts that lower levels of government fragmentation would be more efficient. 
Thus, allowing for externalities from the provision of public goods suggest the need for 
larger governments that internalize those effects. Equally, the costs of collective decision 
making, if assumed not to be zero, are to be reduced by larger government units that 
avoid duplication of functions (i.e. economies of scope).  
 
It may also be the case that not just a single jurisdictional size achieves economies of 
scale, but that the latter are available in full extent once a certain benchmark has been 
passed, as in Figure 3. In this case, larger jurisdictional size after Q* (Figure 3) does not 
provide greater cost savings, but constant average costs. In any case, cost curves such as 
the one depicted in Figure 2 or 3 would signal limits in the extent of economies of scale. 
Beyond a certain level of production, long term average costs either increase or remain 
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constant. For the purpose of determining an optimal jurisdictional size, it would then 
seem that the economies of scale are constrained to certain population limits that are 
largely dependent on the available technology. 
 
 
B 
A 
C 
Q’  Q* 
Q 
LAC 
Figure 3. Alternative shapes of the Long-Term Average Cost Curve 
 
Alternatively, the production function of the service may reflect constant costs of 
production independently of the level of production (as in Figure 4 for the flat LAC 
curve), and thus the size of the jurisdiction would not affect the unit cost of production. 
This is typical of labor-intensive public goods, where there is no need of large capital 
investment start-ups. 
 
The observation of local service delivery patterns across countries shows, however, that 
resorting to other institutional forms of service production may also allow reaching the 
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optimal production level Q* maintaining a given level of government fragmentation. This 
is an important issue that Oates hints at only in passing, but one with considerable 
implications for the “real world”, not fully considered in the model. In particular, Oates 
(1972) argues that, for some services, it may be possible to retain the benefits from 
decentralized provision and produce with economies of scale by resorting to privatization 
or service agreements among governments. It would seem, in principle, that the whole 
range of local services would be eligible for those arrangements, at least those that 
exhibit economies of scale.  
 
 
LAC 
Q 
C 
LAC’ 
 
 
Figure 4. Alternative shapes of the Long-Term Average Cost Curve 
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1.2 A formulation of the standard theoretical model 
 
In the mathematical appendix to his seminal work on fiscal decentralization, Oates (1972) 
derives the equilibrium quantity that minimizes the welfare loss incurred from providing 
a common level of production (as opposed to that preferred by single individuals) for a 
given group of people. His solution is however solely based on the minimization of the 
loss of welfare derived from the joint consumption of a level of public good that is likely 
not to be equal to each individual’s preferences. This solution does not incorporate the 
other element of the trade-off, the benefits derived from the reduction in price from 
economies of scale and larger size. In fact, Oates does not model mathematically the 
optimal jurisdictional size model, but solves for the optimal level of public good 
provision given a certain group size. In this section, we provide a complete formulation 
of the trade-off, with the idea of extending this analysis to the possibilities presented by 
alternatives institutional forms for service delivery. 
 
For extending the model, we will employ Buchanan's (1965) formulation of a theory of 
clubs (which is also the theoretical formulation of Oates’ optimal jurisdictional size 
theory), but allowing for heterogeneous individual preferences. Our approach derives a 
social welfare function (from the summation of individual utility functions) that in itself 
contains the main trade-off between economies of scale and matching heterogeneous 
preferences presented by Oates. The optimal size of the group will then be a function of 
the public service production costs and of the level of jointly-provided public good and 
how the latter varies from each individual’s optimal level. We also delve into Alesina & 
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Spolaore (2003) modeling of optimal jurisdictional size by adopting a uni-dimensional 
linear model whereby losses of welfare can be measured as distance between the 
individual’s preferred consumption level of G and the level provided as a result of the 
collective decision.   
 
As we discussed, we assume in our model a constant and immobile population, zero 
transaction costs for collective decision-making and that the financing of the public good 
provision be efficiency-neutral (i.e. lump sum taxation).  
 
We assume, as before, that individuals have a quasi-linear utility function of the form: 
 
(1) Ui = yi + Γi (DGi),  
 
where DGi is equal to the difference, in absolute value, between the level of public good 
provided and the level that would maximize individual welfare, for each individual. 
Following Oates’ original formulation, the sum of the differences between the level of 
public good provided and that which would maximize the individuals’ utility is likely to 
increase with  the size of the jurisdiction (measured in population terms), and thus, in this 
initial formulation: 
 
(2) DGi = DG (G(N), G*i) 
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Thus, the larger the difference between the level of public good provided and the 
individual’s equilibrium quantity (Gi*, signaling the heterogeneous preferences), the 
larger the loss in welfare, and the larger the amount by which overall individual utility 
would be reduced. Additionally, such distance to the individual optimum will be a 
function of the size of the jurisdiction in population terms N, as the level of G is a 
collective decision that will vary with population size. For simplicity, we assume that the 
utility decreases in an increasing way from larger distances from the individual’s optimal 
level of G, and that equal distances to the individual optimum, be G above or below G*, 
translate into identical losses in welfare: 
 
(3) ∂Ui /∂DGi < 0, and  ∂2Ui /∂DGi2 > 0  
 
(4) ∂Ui /∂DG1 =  ∂Ui /∂DG2 , for each DG1 = Gi*+ξ, and  DG2 = Gi*- ξ,  
 
We define t (the tax price paid for the public good) as equal to the average cost of 
provision, or total cost (C) of production divided by the size of the population served. In 
turn, the total cost is defined as a function of the quantity produced: 
 
(5) t = C/N; where C=C(G) 
 
As the size of the jurisdiction (N) increases, the average cost of provision of the public 
good (G) decreases, improving the individual’s welfare level. The individual’s utility 
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from lower taxes (or average production costs), increases however in a decreasing way, 
represented by the positive value of the second derivative.  
 
(6) ∂Ui /∂t < 0, and  ∂2Ui /∂t2 > 0  
 
This is graphically represented by curve B in our Figure 1 above. The implication of (6) 
above is that individual utility increases with the consumption of the private good, in a 
decreasing way: 
 
(7) ∂Ui /∂y > 0, and  ∂2Ui /∂y2 < 0  
 
An additional member to the jurisdiction adds another person to the collective decision-
making mechanism for the determination of G. Thus the sum of the distances between 
individual preferences of G (Gi*) and the effective level finally provided increases, 
decreasing overall utility.  
 
(8) Σ∂Ui /∂N < 0  
 
This is graphically represented in curve C of our Figure 1 above. 
 
The budget restriction of the individual is equal to: 
 
(9) Mi = yi + t 
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 which states that the individual’s income (assumed exogenously determined) is spent on 
consumption of the private good y and the public good G for which he pays a price equal 
to t.  
 
From the individual maximization problem we obtain the individual’s ideal level of 
public good provision (Gi*), which is the level of public good that would maximize the 
individuals utility given a set of prices. In the following social welfare maximization 
problem, such preferred individual level is considered as exogenous.  
 
Lastly, the transformation function for the economy is of the form F(G,y, N)=0 , meaning 
that the production cost depends on the quantity produced and on the quantity of private 
good required that has to be surrendered for its production. Again to adhere to Oates 
initial formulation, we assume that the production cost for the public good presents 
economies of scale up to a certain range, after which it exhibits decreasing returns to 
scale later, thus giving us a U-shaped cost function. This assumption is later on relaxed 
and its implications explored further. 
 
Under this framework, the individual faces the following maximization problem: 
 
(10) Max [yi + Ui (DGi(G(N), G*i)] 
  s.t. Mi = yi + t 
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By assuming a quasi-linear utility function, social welfare changes are equal to the 
summation of changes in welfare of all the individuals due to variations in t.  
 
Thus, if the government behaves as a benevolent planner, it will try to maximize social 
welfare, defined as the sum of all individual utilities (again assuming the quasi-linear 
form of the utility functions), solving for the optimal size of the group for service 
provision.  
 
Thus we have a social welfare function (SW) of the form: 
 
(11) SW = ΣUi = Σyi +  ΣUi (DGi(G(N), G*i) 
 
The constraint for the entire economy is given by the transformation function: 
 
(12) F(G, y, N) = 0 
 
On those bases, the optimal jurisdictional size would be reached where the Lagrangean £ 
below is maximized: 
 
(13) £ =  Σyi +  Σ{Ui (DGi(G(N), G*i)} – λF(G, yi, N) 
 
As in Oates (1972), we will assume that the production technology is exogenous, which 
will contribute to determine an optimal level of production of the public good. Thus, an 
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increase in the number of individuals sharing the cost increases the individual utility but 
at a decreasing rate. This is a realistic assumption in light of empirical evidence limiting 
the range of economies of scale to certain production ranges, and this would define the 
shape of the benefit curve (B) in Figure 1. 
 
Solving for the optimal group size involves the effects on individual (and social) utility 
derived from the differences between individual preferences and group provision (the 
larger, the larger welfare losses), and the reduction in costs from economies of scale. As 
expected from clubs theory, the optimal size of the group is reached when the marginal 
utility of adding an extra member to the group (negative in this case due to its expected 
influence on DG) equals the marginal cost (also negative as a cost reduction is expected 
from adding yet another taxpayer to the group) of producing the service.  
 
From equation (13) we get the first order conditions: 
 
(14) ∂£ /∂yi = 1 – λ(∂F /∂ yi) = 0 
(15) ∂£ /∂G = Σ{(∂Ui /∂DGi)* (∂DGi /∂G) } - λ(∂F /∂G)  = 0 
(16) ∂£ /∂N = Σ{(∂Ui /∂DGi)* (∂DGi /∂G)* (∂G /∂N)} - λ(∂F /∂N) = 0 
 
Dividing (15) by (14) we obtain: 
 
(17) Σ (∂Ui /∂DG)*(∂DG/∂G) = (∂F /∂G)/(∂F /∂ yi)    
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The left hand side of this equation represents the change in total welfare derived from a 
change in the level of provision of the public good G, which is equal to the marginal rate 
of substitution between the public good (G) and the private good (Y), as (∂Ui /∂Y)=1. On 
the right hand size of the equation we have the marginal rate of transformation between 
the public and the private good. So equivalently: 
 
(18) ΣMRSiG,y = MRTG,y   
 
which is the well-known Samuelson condition, also reached in Buchanan’s (1965) 
analysis of clubs. We can obtain the optimal size of N dividing equation (16) over (14): 
 
(19) Σ{(∂Ui/∂DGi)*(∂DGi/∂G)*(∂G/∂N)} = (∂F /∂N)/ Σ(∂F /∂ yi) 
 
which is also the well-known membership condition in Buchanan’s (1965) theory of 
clubs.  
 
We can therefore re-write (19) as: 
 
(20) ΣMRSiN,y = MRT N,y   
 
The RHS of (20) is the change in the average cost of provision from adding additional 
individual to the population sharing the cost of provision, so we have that 
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(21) MRT N,y  = ∂(C/N)/ ∂N = -C/N2  
 
When we substitute in (20) and solve for N, we obtain: 
 
(22) N* = √(-C/( ΣMRSiN,y)) 
Thus the optimal size of the jurisdiction is positively related to the size of the economies 
of scale and negatively related to the welfare costs derived from heterogeneous 
preferences. 
 
As expected, the optimal jurisdictional size is a function of the production costs and the 
economies of scale derived from the production technology and of the proximity of the 
level of production of the good to the individual preferences of the citizens. This is also 
consistent with Alesina & Spolaore (2003) formulation where optimal jurisdictional size 
is inversely related to the marginal cost of distance (a measure of welfare loss from the 
difference between G* and individual optimal G levels), and positively related to 
economies of scale.  
 
In our formulation, we have assumed a U-shaped long run average cost curve which 
determines the shape of our benefit curve B. The graphical analysis presented by Oates in 
his Fiscal Federalism assumes such a cost structure. We could however consider the 
alternatives to the cost functions discussed earlier in the literature review and the way it 
would affect the solution to the model.  
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In their study of the size of nations, Alesina & Spolaore (2003) model mathematically the 
basic Oates framework for optimal jurisdictional size, using a uni-dimensional model 
whereby physical distance between the individual preferences and the effective level of 
public good provided denote loss of welfare from collective decision making.  
 
This standard framework has been extended in different directions. Besley & Coate 
(2003) show that Oates’ assumption of uniform provision of public good under a 
centralized system can be relaxed without altering the main model result: that under 
heterogeneous preferences for public goods and no spillovers, a decentralization system 
is superior. They also explore the outcomes in terms of public expenditure for different 
political economy models of legislative decision making, minimum winning coalition and 
cooperative legislatures.  
 
1.3 An Extension: Incorporating Political Accountability  
 
As discussed, the Oates model does not incorporate, in the definition of the optimal 
jurisdictional size, the fact that preferences for political representation/accountability may 
affect significantly the size of the optimal jurisdiction. The model assumes that in smaller 
jurisdictions the level of public good provision will be more closely tailored to citizens’ 
preferences. This relationship is not however that straight forward, as the capacity to 
influence government decision may depend on other variables. Arguably, as population 
increases (i.e. jurisdictional size), the relative power of the individual to influence 
government decisions (i.e. political accountability) is diluted. Additionally, in the absence 
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of a decentralized system of government, local political representatives may simply be 
central government appointees. In such a case, local representatives would mostly be 
accountable to the central authorities that appointed them, and not to the citizens they 
would be meant to serve, regardless of the size of the jurisdiction. Secondly, even if 
political representatives are elected locally, they may not enjoy sufficient fiscal autonomy 
so as to significantly determine expenditure patterns in their local governments. This is 
usually the case when local governments are overly dependent on fiscal transfers from 
the central government, very commonly conditional in the nature of expenditure they 
should be used on. Thirdly, even when that autonomy exists for local level 
representatives, the institutional fabric may not be designed so as to allow for citizens’ 
preferences to be conveyed regularly to the local authorities. Participatory budgets, 
citizens’ score cards, and local assemblies are all institutions that allow consistent 
feedback from citizens to their local authorities on their perceptions and preferences 
regarding local service delivery.  
 
An approach to modeling the role of political accountability on the optimal provision of 
public goods under centralized/decentralized systems of government is that of Seabright 
(1996). In his model, political accountability is defined as the probability that the welfare 
of any given locality is the decisive factor in the re-election of its government. Obviously, 
centralization implies a loss of political accountability in that regard. Seabright’s results 
apply even in the case of homogeneous preferences by local citizens. His model uses 
localities’ welfare (and not individuals’) as the unit of analysis, disregarding the 
technology through which individual preferences are translated into localities’ welfare. 
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Importantly, Seabright’s model, although it considers public good provision across three 
different levels of government (national, regional and local), it assumes away the 
possibility of economies of scope in government action.  
 
In an interesting contribution, Tommasi & Weinschelbaum (1999), using a common 
agency principal-agent model also attempt to capture the implications of a preference for 
citizen’s control of the government in the decision to opt over more centralized versus 
decentralized structures of government.   Tommasi & Weinschelbaum (1999) provide a 
good discussion of the channels through which smaller jurisdictional size may assist 
improved political accountability. Those include 1) by having a smaller number of voters, 
there is a higher individual power to affect final output; 2) higher accountability of local 
officials due to their physical proximity to the citizens (Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne, 
1993); and 3) the capacity to compare government’s performance across a range of local 
authorities (yardstick competition). Their model however assumes each individual 
(principal) signs a separate contract with the government (agent) as opposed to the social 
contract that is traditional enforced by voting under either direct or representative 
democracy. In addition, the choice of level of government is conducted at the start of the 
process, and as such is independent initially of the welfare results.  
 
We approach this issue with a simple extension of the basic model described above that 
includes a new variable, political accountability (P), affecting the way preferences are 
reflected into a government’s level of provision of the public good G. It is expected that a 
higher level of political accountability (assumed to be costless) is preferred by citizens, as 
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a signal that their preferences will be more likely incorporated into public policy (and 
budgetary decisions). The greater the size of the jurisdiction (N), the lower the political 
accountability, that is, the lower would be the capacity of citizens to affect the level of 
public good provided.   
Therefore, with the inclusion of P: 
 
(23) DG = DG(G(N), G*i), P), whereby 
(24) (∂DG /∂P) < 0 
 
Thus it is expected that a higher level of political accountability would result in an overall 
lower sum of the distances between individual preferences and the level of provision of 
the public good.  
 
So our new representative individual’s utility function would be: 
 
(25) Ui = yi + Ui (DG(G(N), G*i), P), and as described: 
  
(26) P=P(N,D,FA,CP) 
 
Where D represents the existence of a decentralized government with locally elected 
representatives, FA reflects the degree of fiscal autonomy, and CP is a measure of citizen 
representation in government decision-making (i.e. such as the existence of participatory 
budgeting systems, etc.).  
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 An increase in jurisdictional size is related to lower individual capacity to influence the 
decisions of the politicians, thus reducing political accountability as defined in our model.  
(27) (∂P /∂N)<0 
 
In this case, the individual faces the constraint: 
 
(28) Max yi + Ui [DG(G(N), G*i), P(N)] 
s.t. Mi = yi + t 
 
Where ∂Ui /∂P > 0 , ∂2Ui /∂P2 < 0, that is, an increase in political accountability if 
positively valued by the citizens up to a point where diseconomies of representation (in 
the form of perhaps red-tape, bureaucracy, etc.) offset gains from additional political 
accountability.  
 
Similarly, the maximization problem faced by the benevolent planner of the jurisdiction 
is: 
 
(29) Max £ = Y +  ΣUi [DG(G(N), G*i), P(N)) – λ(F(G,Y,N)] 
 
 
From where we obtain the first order conditions:  
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(30) ∂£ /∂Y = 1 – λ(∂F /∂Y) = 0 
(31) ∂£ /∂G = Σ{(∂Ui /∂DG)* (∂DG /∂G)} - λ(∂F /∂G)  = 0 
(32) ∂£ /∂N = Σ{(∂Ui /∂DG)* (∂DG /∂G)* (∂G /∂N)+ (∂Ui /∂P)* (∂P /∂N)}  –  
λ(∂F /∂N) = 0 
Thus, in equilibrium: 
 
(33) Σ{(∂Ui /∂DG)* (∂DG /∂G)} = (∂F /∂G)/(∂F /∂Y) 
 
From where we obtain identical Samuelson condition: ΣMRSi G,Y = MRTi G,Y 
 
How will the inclusion of our political accountability variable affect optimal size? As in 
the basic model, we divide (32) by (30), substitute λ= 1/(∂F /∂Y) and re-arrange terms: 
 
(34) Σ{(∂Ui /∂DG)* (∂DG /∂G)* (∂G /∂N)+ (∂Ui /∂P)* (∂P /∂N)} = 
(∂F /∂N)/ (∂F /∂Y) 
 
Or equivalently: 
 
(35) ΣMRSiPN,y = MRT N,y   
 
where the superscript P denotes the marginal rate of substitution once political 
accountability is included in the individual utility function.  
 
26 
 
By definition, as (∂Ui /∂P)>0 and  (∂P /∂N)<0, then (∂Ui /∂P)* (∂P /∂N)<0 
 
As Σ{(∂Ui /∂DG)* (∂DG /∂G)* (∂G /∂N) is, by definition, negative (loss in social welfare 
from the addition of one more member to the jurisdiction), with the addition of  (∂Ui 
/∂P)* (∂P /∂N) we conclude that 
 
(36) /ΣMRSiPN,y/  > /ΣMRSiN,y/   
 
The absolute value of the loss in social welfare from one additional member to the 
jurisdiction is greater once we include a preference for political accountability in the 
individual’s welfare function. Not only does utility decrease due to the addition of a new 
consumer’s welfare loss in the form of G-G*i , but now citizens also lose individual 
capacity to influence the decision over G.  
 
Solving for N, we obtain: 
 
(37) NP* = √(-C/ ΣMRSiPN,y) 
 
Which leads us to conclude that Np* < N*, that is, the optimal jurisdictional size for the 
provision of the public good is smaller once we introduce preferences for political 
accountability in the individual’s utility function.  
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The size of the jurisdiction (N) affects welfare in a two-fold way. It does so first, by 
increasing the welfare costs of agreeing on a common level of provision G (greater 
ΣDGi). The larger the group size, the larger the summation, for all citizens, of the 
distance between an individual’s preferred level and the level of good finally provided. 
This effect is independent of the political system in place. Even with a direct democracy 
system, where the level provided is that preferred by the median voter’s, the larger the 
size of the group, the larger will be the loss of welfare from that decision. Secondly, the 
larger the jurisdictional size, the larger the distance between the citizens and their 
representatives. Political accountability is reduced, and with it, the capacity to influence 
the level of provision of the good.  
   
1.4 Accounting for different government levels 
 
As discussed, one of the least explored dimensions of jurisdictional fragmentation is the 
vertical structure of government, that is, the varying number of levels of government we 
observe in countries around the world. Oates (1972) decentralization theorem offered a 
guide for the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to different government levels, 
but takes the vertical structure of government as given and exogenous to the model.  
 
The determination of the efficient number of levels of government is still largely an 
unresolved issue which we explore in this dissertation. Logically, the applied policy 
analysis of the vertical structure of government has taken it as given due to the high 
political and financial cost of consolidating or creating a new level of government. The 
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analysis of social welfare in the provision of public goods by Seabright (1996) compares 
the outcomes of provision by central, regional and municipal levels of government, but 
does not discusses the efficiency in the creation of a new level of government.  
 
We approach this issue by describing a normative, first best model where we assume an 
economy with three types of public goods i =1, 2 and 3. For simplicity, we assume public 
good number 1 presents the characteristics of a pure public good, that is, is perfectly non-
excludable and non-rival. Public goods 2 and 3 are impure public goods whereby the 
externalities from the production of public good 2 are greater than those of 3.  
 
Additionally, we assume that in the original state, only a central and a local level of 
government exist. Central government is assigned responsibility over the provision of 
public good 1 (e.g. defense), whereas goods 2 and 3 are provided by the local 
government. In this framework, under what conditions would the creation of an 
intermediate (or regional) level of government be justified? 
 
As discussed, the “trivial” answer to this question is that the regional level of government 
may be already defined constitutionally and thus be exogenously determined. In our 
model, where a benevolent planner decides the most efficient delivery options for the 
public goods, the decision to create an intermediate (or regional) level of government 
would be justified by improvements in social welfare. 
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Thus, assuming the utility function of the individual is now dependent on the levels of 
provision of the three public goods we have: 
 
 
(38) Ui = yi + Ui (DG1(G1, G1*i), DG2(G2, G2*i), DG3(G3, G3*i ), P) 
s.t. Mi = yi + t 
 
Expression 38 simply expands our utility function as defined in (25) to reflect the 
existence of three public goods. Equally, the social welfare function will be equal to 
 
(39) SW = Σ yi + ΣUi (DG1(G1, G1*i), DG2(G2, G2*i), DG3(G3, G3*i ), P) 
 
which is simply the sum of the individual utilities as in our basic model. In the initial 
situation we had assumed that due to its pure public good characteristics, public good 1 
was being produced by the central government level, while the delivery of public goods 2 
and 3 was assigned to the local government level.  
 
It is straight forward to deduce that a benevolent planner will assign responsibility to a 
regional (or intermediate) level of government if, once the administrative and transactions 
costs, plus the loss of political accountability incurred from the assignment of the 
responsibility over the delivery of a public good to a higher level of government are 
accounted for, the efficiency gains from lower average costs from economies of scale 
exceed the loss in allocative efficiency from a larger jurisdiction.  
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 If we assumed that the public good 2, with greater externalities in its provision, is 
provided by a regional level of government instead of the local level of government, the 
decision will be justified in efficiency terms if: 
 
(40) SW2R > SW2L 
 
Or equally, the creation of a regional level of government would be justified if the social 
welfare from the provision of public good 2 by a regional government (SW2R), ceteris 
paribus, exceeds the social welfare obtained from the original distribution of 
responsibilities (SW2L).  
 
Again, that will mean that for the provision of good 2, the efficiency gains derived from 
the economies of scale obtained by the regional government overwhelm not only the 
efficiency losses derived from a level of provision less tailored to local preferences, but 
also those from lower political accountability, and the higher administrative costs derived 
from a new level of government. In addition, should economies of scope exist, the 
efficiency gains from lower average costs of production would have to make up for the 
loss in economies of scope as well.  
 
This simple model may for instance be an accurate description of the composition of 
certain regions in Spain. After the implementation of the organic law on the organization 
of regional governments, regions where created by the provinces in a voluntary way. For 
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the so called “historical” regions of Spain, such as Catalonia and Galicia, the decision of 
which provinces would create the region was clear and justified in historical and cultural 
as well as economic and political terms. For other provinces however, the decision to join 
a new region was not straight forward. Several alternatives were available for those 
provinces, among them the option to become a single-province region.  
 
Provinces evaluated several aspects of the decision to form a region. In the first place, 
joining provinces with similar preferences for public good provision was obviously an 
important factor in the decision to form a certain region. But also the provincial political 
weight in the new regional institutions was an important aspect to consider. Thus, 
provinces were more likely to form regions where their political leverage (and thus 
accountability to their citizens) was greater. All these aspects are considered in our 
simple model. 
 
The obvious extension to this model, not developed in this dissertation, is to account for 
the positive aspects of the formation of new levels of government. This would for 
example involve developing a sequence for the formation of regional governments where 
local authorities evaluate the impact of such an event on their re-election chances among 
other things. In any case, our simple model allows us to test in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation some basic hypothesis about the current vertical structure of government 
across countries.    
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CHAPTER 2  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN LOCAL PUBLIC 
SERVICES: A META-ANALYSIS. 
“Most researchers conclude that approximately 80 percent of local government activities 
do not possess economies of scale beyond relatively small municipalities with 
populations of 10,000 to 20,000.” (Bish 2001. p.14) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The standard theory of optimal jurisdictional size developed by Oates and extended later 
on by other authors (e.g., Alesina & Spolaore (2003)) hinges importantly on the existence 
of economies of scale in the provision of local public goods and services. Despite the fact 
that many countries have embarked on forced jurisdictional consolidation programs on 
the basis of insufficient economies of scale in the delivery of local public services, an 
empirical justification for this type of policy remains elusive. Although it would be 
unreasonable to expect that local governments’ size match adequately the efficient scale 
of production for public services, it could be equally unreasonable to assume, for all 
services involved, that larger jurisdictions will necessarily have a more efficient scale. 
The ambiguous and sometimes conflicting evidence regarding the existence of economies 
of scale in local public service provision demands at this time a systematic quantitative 
analysis that summarizes and evaluates the evidence available on this issue. The goal of 
this chapter is to produce this quantitative review using a meta-analysis approach.   
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2.2 Economies of scale, definition and interpretations 
 
The internationally widespread political drive for less sub-national government 
fragmentation is underpinned by the search for economies of scale that are supposed to 
reduce the average cost of output, or as Dollery & Crase (2004; p.268) put it, “a decrease 
in the cost per person for a given amount of service as population served increases”. A 
production process is characterized by economies of scale if, “when all inputs are 
increased by a certain factor λ, output increases by a factor larger than that λ” (Panzar & 
Willig, 1977). Alternatively, we can also say that economies of scale exist when we can 
increase the production of a good or service without increasing productions costs in the 
same proportion.  
 
The source of such economies of scale can be varied. They could be derived from the 
specialization of the production process (which may only be viable for larger levels of 
output); they may originate from increased bargaining power with suppliers once 
production increases (leading to lower or discounted prices for inputs); or additionally 
they may be related to the spread of fixed costs across larger production levels (thus 
reducing average prices).  
 
The most commonly used mathematical formulation of economies of scale is owed to 
Baumol, Panzar, & Willig (1988): 
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Economies of scale (S), or increasing returns to scale (used interchangeably here forth) 
exist when S >1, that is, when the marginal cost of production is below the average cost. 
Constant or decreasing returns to scale exist when S is equal or less than one respectively. 
In elasticity terms, economies of scale exist when the cost elasticity of output (ߝ௬ሻ is 
smaller than 1. 4 
 
The literature has predominantly used this definition of economies of scale, although 
other contributions have also merited attention. In particular, Caves, Christensen, & 
Tretheway (1984), in their analysis of scale economies of local service airlines costs, 
include a measure of network length (or points served) for the calculation of economies 
of scale. Thus, in their interpretation, short-term economies of scale are defined as: 
ܴܶܵ ൌ  
1
ߝ௬ ൅ ߝே
 
 
where ߝ௬ is the cost elasticity of output and ߝே is the cost elasticity of network length. As 
in Baumol et al, returns to scale exist when RTS >1. In addition, Caves et al. (1984) 
argue that the estimation of long-term economies of scale needs to take into account the 
quasi-fixed production inputs (Z) and thus: 
                                                            
4 The definition implies that the cost elasticity of output cannot be zero, as that would 
lead to infinite economies of scale, an unreasonable result.  
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where  ߝ௓ is the cost elasticity of quasi-fixed production inputs5. The empirical literature 
on the existence of economies of scale in the production of public services has 
concentrated on the estimation of the cost elasticity of output, using a variety of modeling 
frameworks. Important contributions to the literature have adopted however the 
interpretation of economies of scale proposed by Caves et al. (1984), such as in Mizutani 
& Urakami (2001), Aubert & Reynaud (2005) or Filippini & Prioni (2003). A thorough 
review of the available empirical evidence yields, as we will see, an inconclusive picture. 
This is perhaps to be expected. There does not seem to be, at least a priori, a strong 
theoretical case to assume that any local public service will display similar patterns in 
terms of economies of scale across the wide range of existing local governments and 
technologies available for public service production (Dollery & Crase, 2004).  
 
2.3 “Stylized facts” from the review of the literature 
An initial review of the literature unveils a series of “stylized facts” that help shape our 
quantitative analysis below. This section benefits from excellent earlier reviews such as 
those from Boyne (1995), Andrews, Duncombe, & Yinger (2002) in the area of 
education, Byrnes J. & Dollery B. (2002) for Australian local governments, or more 
recently Bel (2009) for selected sectors. 
 
                                                            
5 By quasi-fixed production inputs the authors refer to the fact although in the long-run all 
inputs are traditionally assumed to be variable, some of them, including capital and labor 
for instance, can be just partially adjustable.  
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a. Capital vs. Labor-Intensive Services 
First, from our theoretical framework, it would be reasonable to assume that economies 
of scale are more likely to be found in capital intensive goods or services, where the 
investment in capital goods (i.e. fixed costs) can be spread across more units of output 
(Dollery & Fleming, 2006). In Chile, Albala-Bertrand & Mamatzakis (2004) find 
economies of scale in the provision of transport, sewerage, and power grid services. Bel 
(2005) and Alvarez, Caride, & Gonzalez (2003) show that solid waste collection and 
processing offers important savings in productions costs derived from larger client 
populations in Spain. This is a finding shared equally by Callan & Thomas (2001) in their 
study of 110 municipalities in the Massachusetts area, and by McDavid (2000), who 
studies cost patterns for 327 local governments of less than 1000 citizens in Canada. 
 
Following Bel (2009), the review of recent work in the analysis of returns to scale in the 
operation of airports displays constant returns to scale in relation to airplanes movement 
and strong economies of scale in passenger traffic for smaller airports. Efficiency gains 
disappear however when the analysis is extended to very large, international airports, 
reflective of a traditional U-shape long term average cost curve (Pels, Nijkamp, & 
Rietveld (2003); Bazargan & Vasigh (2003)). In the area of urban transport, seemingly 
contradictory results are found depending on the sample used for the analysis. For 
example, Berechman (1983) finds economies of scale in the operation of buses in Israel 
but constant returns to scale are found in the works of Matas & Raymond (1998) for 
Spain and Filippini & Prioni (2003) for Switzerland. In addition, increasing although 
moderate returns to scale in the Swiss urban transport are found by Farsi, Fetz, & 
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Filippini (2007). More conclusive is the evidence obtained from works in the area of 
garbage collection, where solid evidence of economies of scale are generally found (Bel, 
2009).  
 
A corollary of the above cost theory proposition is that labor intensive local services 
should offer less potential for economies of scale. A pioneering reference is the work of 
Hirsch (1959) for U.S. municipalities, discarding the existence of economies of scale in 
police services. Examining 44 cities and districts of Seattle’s metropolitan area, 
Ahlbrandt (1973) does not find economies of scale in the provision of firefighting 
services. Similar conclusions are found in the studies of Alt (1971), Boaden (1971) and 
Danzinger (1978) in England and Wales. In the United States, Ostrom & Parks (1973), 
Dilorenzo (1981) and Gyimah-Brempong (1987) find evidence of higher production costs 
in firefighting and police services with the greater population size of the jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, Bodkin & Conklin (1971) report declining average costs of production 
with higher population size in these two commonly local U.S. services. 
 
However, in the provision of public schooling -- a labor intensive service although one 
with potentially higher overhead costs than police of fire services for instance, economies 
of scale are found by Chambers (1978), Butler & Monk (1985, for relatively small 
districts), Callan & Santerre (1990), Duncombe, Miner, & Ruggiero (1995), Jimenez 
(1986), and Reschovsky & Imazeki (1997, 1999)). On the other hand, Gyimah-Brempong 
& Gyapong (1991) find decreasing returns to scale in the production of education in 
Michigan school districts. A general conclusion of these studies was that such economies 
38 
 
of scale were extinguished at relatively low levels of enrolment. Duncombe et al. (1995) 
show that the consolidation of school districts in the State of New York may have offered 
savings in education costs, although the gains were limited to the consolidation of 
districts with less than 500 students. A similar study for Iowa by Edelman & Knudsen 
(1990) concluded that the gains in terms of economies of scale were found for student 
populations between 800 and 900, while in Maine, Deller & Rudnicki (1992) estimated 
the optimal size of the education district at around 2000 students. 
 
b. Measurement, measurement, measurement 
The mixed evidence for economies of scale gathered from the empirical literature may 
well be due to critical differences in the measures of output and production costs used in 
the analyses. In their review of previous works on the existence of economies of scale in 
Australian local government, Byrnes & Dollery (2002) conclude that, even when 
homogeneous goods are analyzed, the evidence as to whether economies of scale exist in 
their production is inconclusive. They argue that inaccurate measures of 
output/production and costs are partly to blame for the variety of results found in this 
branch of the literature. Most of the studies Byrnes & Dollery (2002) review assume 
service production is responsive to population and thus use the latter as a proxy for the 
former. In addition, they argue, the common use of total expenditure as a measure of cost, 
although reasonable, does not solve the problem of allocating administrative costs, which 
may be substantial to the operation.  
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This general critique to the body of empirical contributions in this area is an old one. 
Already Tiebout (1960) criticized Hirsch’s seminal contributions to the literature for his 
use of population as a proxy for public service output. Tiebout (1960; p.444) argued 
reasonably that “there is no necessary relationship between population and either the 
output or quality of the good”. In fact, larger population may lead, Tiebout argues, to 
larger per capita expenditures, implying no economies of scale. Studies using population 
as a proxy for output levels are rare nowadays, although they represented a substantial 
share of early works in this empirical area. 
 
The use of expenditure data instead of cost data for the estimation of cost functions has 
also been severely criticized for obvious reasons. Changes in per capita expenditures in a 
public service may be due to reasons other than production costs (including 
administrative inefficiencies) (Tiebout, 1960; Breton, 1965; Duncombe & Yinger, 2007). 
As cost data have been made increasingly available, empirical works have favored their 
use and the number of academic contributions using per capita expenditure as a proxy for 
average cost has declined over time.  
 
There is substantial evidence in the literature that the size of economies of scale is largely 
affected by the measure of output selected, even when the measures refer to the same 
service. In their study of cost of bus services provision in Switzerland, Filippini & Prioni 
(2003) find larger economies of scale when the output measure is the number of bus stops 
as opposed to bus-kilometers. This finding corroborates the results from Berechman & 
Giuliano (1984), who find diseconomies of scale in bus operation in the US if bus-miles 
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are used as output measure and economies of scale if revenue per passenger is used. Thus 
it would seem clear that the existence of economies of scale in the delivery of public 
services may be reasonably dependent on the output measure selected.      
 
c. A U-shaped Average Cost Function 
A third salient aspect of the initial review of the literature in studies using jurisdictions 
(as opposed to production units) as the focus of analysis is the concentration of 
economies of scale in smaller (population-wise) jurisdictions. This signals perhaps the 
expected U-shape of the long-term average cost curve for public service production. The 
seminal Hirsch (1959) study reports evidence of economies of scale in firefighting 
services in municipalities of less than 100,000 people and increasing average costs over 
that population size. Bodkin & Conklin (1971) find evidence of declining average costs 
in police and firefighting services for localities of between 5,000 and 10,000 people. 
Additionally Gyimah-Brempong (1987), in his analysis of the Florida case, estimated that 
diseconomies of scale in the provision of police services start at population levels of 
around 50,000 residents. More recently, Sole-Olle & Bosch (2005) find substantial 
economies of scale for provision of local government services in Spanish municipalities 
with a population below 5,000 citizens, but growing unit costs of provision until the 
population is over or about 50,000. Using a sample of Catalonian municipalities, Bel & 
Fagueda (2009) show evidence of substantial economies of scale in solid waste collection 
(attained by inter-municipal cooperation in the provision of this service) for 
municipalities below 20,000 citizens, but no gains in unit costs for municipalities over 
that population. In Sweden, Nelson (1992) shows that savings in the production of local 
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services derived from municipal consolidation seem limited to municipalities of very 
small population size (below 2,000 citizens after the consolidation). In light of these and 
other contributions, Bish (2001; p.14) concludes that “approximately 80 percent of local 
government activities do not possess economies of scale beyond relatively small 
municipalities with populations of 10,000 to 20,000”.  
 
The review of the empirical evidence also shows different within-country results in terms 
of whether economies of scale are present, depending on the sample of jurisdictions and 
databases used. This finding is more evident in a third group of studies that analyzes 
overall expenditure patterns before and after processes of jurisdictional consolidation or 
inter-municipal cooperation. It is perhaps to be expected that once we aggregate all local 
expenditure on public goods and services the evidence of economies of scale would be 
even more inconclusive. This is due to the fact that, as discussed, we would be 
aggregating both capital- and labor-intensive services, with different potential in the 
reduction of average production costs due to larger volume.  
 
Thus, in a series of studies in the early 1970s, Davies, Barton, & Williamson (1971), and 
Davies & McMillan (1972) report increasing costs of provision (measured as total local 
public expenditure, excluding social services) with higher population size in the U.K., a 
result also partially confirmed by Mehay (1981). Abelson (1981, in Byrnes & Dollery, 
2002) finds that, for 36 Australian municipalities, the average public expenditure per 
household does not decrease as population increases. Conversely, the analysis of the 
Australian Institute of Public Affairs (1993, in Byrnes & Dollery, 2002) advises of 
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possible economies of scale in the consolidation of 210 counties in the province of 
Victoria. This report, together with that of the consulting firm KPMG (1998, in Byrnes & 
Dollery, 2002), which suggested potential savings of up to 24% in the provision of local 
public services for 177 Australian local governments were critical elements in the 
consolidation process that took place in Australia during the 1990s (Byrnes & Dollery, 
2002).  
 
d. Modeling frameworks for the cost function 
The body of empirical literature on the analysis of economies of scale in local service 
delivery has seen three somewhat overlapping but otherwise well differentiated stages in 
the modeling of production cost functions. Early works in this area used a linear function, 
quadratic in the measure of output, to establish the existence of U-shaped cost curves. 
Contributions include the early works of Hirsch (1959, 1965), Bodkin & Conklin (1971), 
Beaton (1974), Knapp (1982), Kumar (1983), among others. The academic standards of 
the early contributions are arguably weaker than those of more recent works. Many of the 
articles reviewed from this early stage do not provide descriptive statistics of the 
variables used for instance, turning the calculation of elasticity into an impossible feat. 
The sample of observations for the meta-analysis suffers therefore from a bias towards 
more recent articles.  
 
A second wave of contributions to the analysis of economies of scale in local service 
delivery incorporates logarithmic cost functions that allow the direct estimation of cost 
elasticity of production. This sub-sample of works assumes a Cobb-Douglas production 
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function, a modeling framework that still incorporates important limitations in the 
analysis of economies of scale, such as the assumed constant elasticity of substitution of 
factors of production and returns to scale, and the homotheticity of the production 
function (Gyimah-Brempong, 1987). The largest number of available works has used this 
modeling framework, including the seminal contribution from Stevens (1978) in the 
sector of refuse collection, Duncombe et al. (1995) in education, or Christoffersen, 
Paldam, & Wurtz (2007) in the cleaning of schools in Denmark.  
 
The third and more recent wave of empirical works in this area have favored heavily the 
use of the translogarithmic cost functions as a modeling framework. Contrary to the 
Cobb-Douglas, the multi-product translog cost function places fewer restrictions on the 
parameters (e.g., does not assume constant elasticity of substitution of factors of 
production), and allows for the analysis of multi-product production processes that are 
common in certain sectors (e.g. primary and secondary education for instance). An early 
contribution in the area of bus transport that uses the translog modeling framework is that 
of Berechman (1983), but the framework has been recently applied to every possible 
service including Drake & Simper (2002) in the area of police, Fabbri & Fraquelli (2000) 
in water supply, or Jimenez (1986) in education. The more sophisticated modeling 
framework offered by the translog function signals the potentially more accurate and 
solid estimates of economies of scale, so any quantitative analysis of the literature must 
control for this important development.  
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In conclusion, evidence of economies of scale for local public good provision that would 
justify Oates' (1972) theoretical argument for larger governmental units can be found but 
needs to be adequately contextualized. To the significant empirical limitations related to 
the measurement of output and cost of service production, we must add the complications 
generated by different (and coexisting) technologies and specificities of geographical 
areas. Our initial review of the literature leads us to conclude that economies of scale, 
when found, are sector specific, population bound, and perhaps even temporary in their 
range and size, depending on the available technologies of production of the particular 
time period. Only a small share of locally provided services may offer economies of scale 
from larger size jurisdictions.  
 
As a preliminary conclusion, it may be that a more careful examination of the evidence, 
in particular the realization of the limited size of economies of scale, may have led to the 
promotion and development of alternative institutional solutions to service delivery that 
did not involve the forced consolidation of sub-national units of government. But in 
addition, as Oates’ trade off suggests, even when economies of scale exist, certain 
inefficiencies in costs may have been worth paying for in exchange for larger 
improvements in allocative efficiency from smaller size local governments. However, 
making these judgments requires a more precise and systematic knowledge of economies 
of scale in the production and delivery of public goods. We next turn to how this more 
precise information may be produced.   
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2.4 Meta-analysis: a systematic, quantitative literature review 
As we have seen above, consistent empirical evidence of economies of scale in the 
delivery of local public services is somewhat elusive in the literature. The wide variety of 
public services studied, the numerous modeling and empirical frameworks employed, and 
the long time frame over which the literature in this area spans has complicated reaching 
solid conclusions on the patterns of such economies of scale when available. Thus, there 
is an obvious need to systematically and quantitatively review this important body of 
literature so as to distill its main findings and be able to inform public policy in this area 
in a less ambiguous manner. In this section we describe the process proposed for the 
development of a meta-analysis of the literature, which we believe goes a long way in 
meeting those goals. 
 
The meta-analysis methodology allows combining the results of various studies testing a 
particular hypothesis with the ultimate objective of deriving the average “true effect” of 
the issue being analyzed, while controlling for the heterogeneity of studies examined. 
This statistical method adds value well beyond the simple average survey method, as 
each study estimate is weighted by its standard error. The weighted averages thus 
obtained from the meta-regression are more powerful and reliable estimates of the effects 
being considered than a simple average.  
 
Meta-analysis as a methodology can assist in “summarizing, reviewing and evaluating 
empirical research results” (Stanley, 2001; p.131). The use of meta-analysis has become 
increasingly widespread in economics and other social sciences, but the methodology has 
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been especially popular among medical researchers that required consolidating the results 
from empirical tests with few individuals into more powerful statistical analysis (Sutton, 
Abrams, Jones, Sheldon, & Song, 2000). Seminal meta-analysis in economics include 
those of Jarrell & Stanley (1990) on the Union-Nonunion wage gap, and Card & 
Krueger's (1995) on time-series studies of the impact of minimum wage on employment 
creation. The methodology has become very popular among economists recently. An 
EconLit database search revealed a total of 385 references to meta-analysis between 1985 
and 2009, a considerable and multidisciplinary effort, with contributions focusing on 
environmental, transport, and labor topics. Although still scarce, increasing use of the 
methodology seems to have been made in the area of public finance.6The meta-analysis 
methodology is especially apt as a way to consolidate results from controlled 
experiments. It is perhaps the relatively recent use of lab studies in the area of economics 
that has prevented a more extensive use of the methodology. The recent wave of 
experimental work in economics, traditionally based in small sample studies, will be 
likely to raise interest in meta-analysis in the near future. 
 
In spite of that, the topic at hand seems like a perfect fit for the application of the meta-
analysis methodology. The literature spans over several decades, the results in terms of 
the existence (or not) of economies of scale in local public service delivery are scattered 
and seem to be contingent of many factors (technology, population sizes, sample, 
modeling framework, cost function, etc.). Thus, the main objective of our meta-analysis 
                                                            
6 These include Feld & Heckemeyer's (2009) meta-analysis of FDI and taxation, Bom & 
Ligthart's (2009) on the productivity of public capital, or Blackwell's (2007) analysis of 
tax compliance experiments, the latter two still being work in progress.  
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is to conduct a quantitative, systematic review of the empirical literature on the existence 
of economies of scale on the provision of local public services to synthesize the existing 
empirical evidence to date. In the next paragraphs we follow Stanley's (2001) stages for 
the development of our meta-analysis. 
 
a. Identifying all relevant studies and choosing a common metric 
The first stage of a meta-analysis is to identify as complete a sample of studies in the area 
of interest as possible. We reviewed 103 empirical studies in total from a variety of 
sources and journals on economies of scale in local public service delivery, including 
several PhD Dissertations and unpublished papers.  
 
The scope of our meta-analysis includes all published or unpublished empirical papers in 
the area, published in English or Spanish. Our search included two standard databases 
(EconLit and Dissertation abstracts) and the Google Scholar and the Google and Bing 
standard search engines, without any time period restriction. We contacted several 
authors for unpublished papers, dissertations, and government reports, with mixed 
success.  In addition, the bibliographies of all papers reviewed were scanned for 
additional studies, applying a “snowball” approach to study identification. 
 
Having obtained 103 papers overall on the topic, the selection of pieces for the meta-
analysis used the following criteria. First, we selected for the meta-analysis only papers 
that referred to local government provided services. There exist substantial contributions 
on the economies of scale of some public services that are not local in nature, such as 
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power generation or regional transportation services. The latter were excluded from the 
analysis. Second, we eliminated from our pool of papers those which did not use 
regression analysis as the main estimation methodology for economies of scale. This may 
have biased the sample towards more recent contributions, more prone to use regressions 
as opposed to other methodologies, such as simple correlation coefficients.  
 
Third, the review of the literature unveiled a series of studies using the production 
function approach to the analysis of local public service provision. None of these studies 
can be incorporated into the dataset as they truly do not test for economies of scale, but 
for the impact of financing levels on critical performance indicators. In these studies, the 
left hand side variable is traditionally a measure of service quality (i.e. average value of 
standardized tests in education, etc.), not the production costs. Thus, they offer 
complementary but different contributions that cannot be incorporated into our 
quantitative review.  
  
Fourth, the selection of our variable of interest introduced additional limitations to the 
papers that could be used. The hypothesis we would like to test in this meta-analysis is 
that “economies of scale exist in the production of local public services.” Note that we 
bundle all local services. It makes sense to include all local services in our study because, 
in most countries, jurisdictional consolidation precisely requires the delivery of all 
services to a larger population, as opposed to a small or selective set of public services.7 
                                                            
7 If special districts exist for the delivery of separate services, as is the case in the U.S. 
with school districts etc., then it can make sense to conduct the study for unbundled 
49 
 
Positive testing of the hypothesis would provide support to the consolidation of small 
local governments into larger jurisdictional units.  
 
Our theoretical framework and hypothesis defines the cost elasticity of output as the 
variable of interest for the study. This statistic allows summarizing the empirical results 
of the literature and is therefore used as the dependent variable of the meta-analysis8. The 
use of the cost elasticity of output as our measure of economies of scale immediately 
imposes additional restrictions on our sample of studies. Papers where the statistic is not 
reported or from which it cannot be calculated were discarded. As discussed, several of 
the early contributions in this area use a linear (and quadratic) cost functional form. 
When descriptive statistics are provided, we can calculate the attached elasticity and thus 
the paper is added to the dataset. In many cases however such information is not available 
and the paper is discarded.  
 
The selection process outlined above left us eventually with 44 studies that reported 60 
values of the cost elasticity of output for different services. Of those 60 observations, 44 
reported their attached standard errors and 16 did not. The availability of standard errors 
is essential as the meta-analysis essentially weights the observations by their variance. In 
their absence, other measures of study size can be used (e.g. the inverse of the degrees of 
freedom of the study, for instance) but are generally less satisfactory. Our empirical work 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
services. But in this case the challenge can become the number of observations available 
to conduct reliable statistical analysis.   
8 Earlier contributions in this literature, using as the dependent variable for the study the 
total cost of production (in monetary terms) did not offer a realistic or theoretically sound 
alternative for the selection of our statistic of interest. 
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will include estimates of the average “true” value of economies of scale for those 
observations for which standard errors are reported and for the whole sample of 
observations (60) using a different measure of study size. In addition to a greater wealth 
of information, this allow for a sensitivity test of our results.   
 
The data set includes studies from 1978 to 2008. As discussed, several studies offer more 
than one observation, and we include them all in the dataset. Observations for a total of 8 
services and 19 countries are included. As it is traditionally the case with cross sections, 
the data set of studies suffers from unobserved heterogeneity, as not all relevant 
moderators may have been coded.  
 
As we expected, the inclusion of studies that used translog cost functions also required 
calculating the individual statistic where the estimate of economies of scale, as opposed 
to the cost elasticity of output, was reported. When the study estimated both the Cobb-
Douglas and translog functional forms of the cost function, the translog estimate of cost 
elasticity of output was selected for consistency, unless the Cobb-Douglas estimate was 
the preferred estimate of the author.  
 
The alternative use of the (Caves et al., 1984) measure of economies of scale and the 
Baumol et al. (1988) measure introduces a certain level of heterogeneity in the value of 
the dependent variable. The former, as we discussed earlier, includes in the estimation 
economies of scale a measure of network length. As it was not possible to completely 
homogenize the statistics from the studies, our meta-regression controls accordingly for 
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this fact with a variable (baumol) with value one for the studies using the Baumol et al. 
(1988) measure of economies of scale and zero otherwise.  
 
Sample dependency in meta-analysis is a common risk that can manifest itself in a variety 
of forms. First, it may be that a large number of observations are obtained from the same 
study (and thus the same sample). This may include observations obtained from different 
estimation methods over the same sample, or the use of the same sample by many 
different researchers.  
 
Fortunately, all of the studies included in our dataset use different samples, which limits 
this type of dependency to the greatest possible extent, making our observations fully 
independent. In our dataset, we also include the author’s preferred model specification or 
estimation in the cases where more than one regression is run on the same sample. It is 
the case however that several studies present estimations over different samples. In some 
cases, the samples are independent from each other and their inclusion as separate 
observations does not present further problems. In other cases, several estimations are 
obtained from different sub-sets of the same sample. We also include them as separate 
observations, but control in our meta-regression with a dummy variable for studies from 
which we obtain more than one data point. 
 
A different type of dependency is that caused by errors in the specifications of the 
econometric model that are reproduced in other studies. In our sample, this would 
include, for instance, the need to control for the possibility of joint public and private 
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provision of the service being analyzed, or the possibility of multi-product functions. We 
define moderators in our right hand side of the equation to control for such instances.  
   
b. Meta-regression 
As discussed, the studies analyzed differ in many critical dimensions, including the 
functional form of the cost equation, the estimation method, and even on the measure of 
production. The presence of this vast “between-study heterogeneity” requires the 
application of meta-regression techniques that allow for random-effects estimation rather 
than the fixed-effect meta-analysis commonly employed for highly homogenous studies. 
With a meta-regression we can investigate “the extent to which statistical heterogeneity 
between results of multiple studies can be related to one or more characteristics of the 
studies” (Hardbord and Higgings 2008; p.493).  
 
In a random-effects meta-regression, the individual study estimates of the variable of 
interest (in our case the cost elasticity of output) are assumed to be distributed normally 
around a mean effect θ and with a between-study variance τ2 and a standard error of each 
study denoted as σi. More specifically, we assume, following Harbord & Higgings (2008) 
that: 
 
ݕ௜| ߠ௜ ~  ~ ܰ ௜ߚ, ߬ଶሻ  ܰሺߠ௜, ߪଶሻ,        ݓ݄݁ݎ݁   ߠ௜ ሺݔ
ܽ݊݀ ݐ݄ݑݏ     ݕ௜~ ܰሺݔ௜ߚ, ߪଶ ൅ ߬ଶሻ 
equivalently, 
ݕ௜ ൌ  ݔ௜ߚ ൅  ݑ௜ ൅ ߝ௜, ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ݑ௜~ ܰሺ0, ߬ଶሻ  ܽ݊݀  ߝ௜~ ܰሺ0, ߪଶሻ 
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 Our dependent variable for the meta-analysis is the cost elasticity of output obtained from 
the studies reviewed. Regressors or independent variables include the moderators 
identified during the process of coding and detailed above. Over this database, we 
perform Variance Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression analysis9 in order to attach 
more weight to estimations with lower standard error and thus more accurate. We aim to 
estimate the average (true) cost elasticity of output for local public service delivery. The 
algorithm used for the estimation calculates first the between study variance (τ2) and later 
the β-coefficients using as weights 1/(σ2 + τ2).  
 
The unconditional (average) cost elasticity of output in our sample of 61 observations is 
0.7304, that is, if service output increases by a 1 percent, the cost of provision increases 
by 0.73 percent, signaling some substantial economies of scale. The results of the meta-
regression are presented in section 4.5 below. 
 
In our analysis we will assess the potential for publication bias in the sample. As 
discussed, we defined publication bias as the higher likelihood that a study is published if 
it reports statistically significant results. Thus, following Bom & Ligthart (2009) we 
assume that: 
 
ߠ෠௜ ൌ  ߠ௜ ൅  ݃ ቀݏ݁൫ߠ෠௜൯ቁ ൅  ߤ௜ 
 
                                                            
9 Using the metareg command of Stata 
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where ߠ෠௜ represents the observed estimates, ߠ௜ is the population parameter and μ is the 
sampling error. So if there is publication bias, the insertion of the standard errors in the 
meta-regression should yield statistically significant coefficients for that variable. In 
Table 1 below we test for the existence of publication bias without the insertion of any 
moderator variables yet. Previous studies have assumed publication bias is linear (Card & 
Krueger, 1995), whereas others (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2007) argue the relationship 
between the estimate and its standard error is more likely to be non-linear and propose a 
quadratic approximation. In their study of the output elasticity of public capital, Bom & 
Ligthart (2009) present one of the most comprehensive analysis of publication bias to 
date, and their analysis is replicated below. In particular, the analysis will allow 
identifying the direction of the bias and select the appropriate control for our meta-
regression including all relevant moderators.   
 
Following Bom & Ligthart (2009), we estimate the equation: 
 
ߠ෠௜ ൌ  ߠ଴ ൅  ෍ ߚ௝ݔ௜௝
ே
௝ୀଵ
൅  ߙ௣ݏ݁൫ߠ෠௜൯
௛
ܦ௣௜ ൅ ߙ௡ݏ݁൫ߠ෠௜൯
௛
ܦ௡௜ ൅ ߤ௜ 
 
where, as discussed, ߠ෠௜ represents the observed cost elasticity estimates, ߠ௜ is the 
population parameter and μ is the sampling error. The term ∑ ߚ௝ݔ௜௝ே௝ୀଵ  represents the 
moderator variables coded in our meta-analysis, whereas ܦ௣ (ܦ௡ሻ are dummy variables 
with value 1 if ߠ෠௜ is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. They are interacted with the 
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standard errors of the estimates ߠ෠௜. The structure of the equation allows us to test for 
different versions of publication bias. 
 
If the term ∑ ߚ௝ݔ௜௝ே௝ୀଵ  is eliminated, we can test for publication bias in the (assumed) 
absence of heterogeneity between studies, as we do in Tables 1 and 2 below. If both the 
ߙ௣ݏ݁൫ߠ෠௜൯
௛
ܦ௣௜ and  ߙ௡ݏ݁൫ߠ෠௜൯
௛
ܦ௡௜ terms are included in the regression as moderators, we 
are able to test for bidirectional publication bias. Lastly, if we include solely the standard 
error as one term in the regression (that is, ܦ௣ = ܦ௡ = h = 1), we are able to test for 
unidirectional publication bias. The superscript h allows us to introduce the non-linear 
publication bias test. Thus, if h=1, we test for linear publication bias, but if h=2, we 
assume a quadratic, non-linear relation between the estimates and their standard errors.  
 
c. Identifying moderator variables: The coding process and related hypotheses 
During the coding process of the empirical papers identified we identified a large number 
of aspects that may have determined the overall results found in the previous empirical 
literature. Accordingly, dummy variables were created to control for them. A complete 
list of variables is provided in Box 1. Not all of the moderators where eventually used in 
the regression analysis due to their lack of significance and to ensure adequate degrees of 
freedom. Here we discuss the issues with greater theoretical support.  
 
First, our coding process included the creation of a variable for the country in which the 
study took place. Almost half of the 60 observations eventually considered for the meta-
regression where from U.S.-based studies, but the sample also included several European, 
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Asian and Latin American countries. The dataset also creates a moderator variable 
representing whether the unit of analysis for the study was a production unit (i.e. bus 
public company for instance) or a jurisdiction (including studies with municipal, district, 
or city focus). A certain overlap is observed however between this variable and the one 
that denotes whether cost or expenditure data were used as the dependent variable of the 
analysis, perhaps increasing the risk of multi-collinearity if both are included at the same 
time.   
 
In terms of the characteristics of the dataset for each of the studies reviewed, we created 
dummies denoting where a cross-section, panel, or time series was used. Following 
Berechman & Giuliano (1984), cross sectional data renders biased estimates as it assumes 
homogeneity of the observations (i.e. jurisdictions, public companies, etc.). The direction 
of this bias is not clear however and is a matter left to the empirical analysis. Equally, we 
coded the estimation method of the cost function, a variable also closely linked to the 
dataset structure.  
 
With regard to the modeling framework of the cost function, we created dummy variables 
for studies using linear, log-linear or translog functional forms of the production cost 
function. As discussed, the translog modeling framework, which limits the assumptions 
imposed on the behavior of the dependent variable, is expected to provide more solid 
estimations results although, again, the direction (or sign) of the coefficient is an 
empirical question.  
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A dummy variable was created to denote, with a value of one, if expenditure (as opposed 
to cost) data were used as dependent variable in the analysis; this moderator is expected 
to bias downwards the estimates of economies of scale if expenditure data are used. In 
addition, we created a dummy variable denoting whether the output variable used 
population as a proxy (value 0) or rather a physical measure of output (i.e. gallons of 
water, tones of garbage, etc.).  
 
Other moderator variables created during the coding process included a variable denoting 
whether the Baumol et al. (1988) or the Caves et al. (1984) definitions of economies of 
scale were used in the study. It is to be expected that estimated cost elasticity of output 
would be lower with the latter than with the former, as already discussed. In addition, we 
created dummies for whether the study controlled for service production alternatives (i.e. 
private, public, volunteer services), for cases where the analysis was disaggregated by 
population groups, and for cases where more than one observation was obtained from the 
same study. Finally, our study size variables included the elasticity’s standard errors and 
the degrees of freedom of each study. 
 
Importantly, our sample of studies used a great diversity of data sets, which led us to 
conclude there is no data dependency or sample overlap in this particular case.10 We 
believe that all relevant dimensions of the studies could be coded, but as more 
                                                            
10 For example, an area where there is potential for dataset dependency is that of 
comparative fiscal decentralization studies, where the use of the International Monetary 
Fund’s Global Financial Statistics is widespread.  
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observations are made available, the data set should continue to evolve and improve in 
the future.  
 
Table 1. Moderator Variables Coded from the Literature Review 
Dimension Variable Definition Number of 
Observations 
Year of 
Survey 
1970s Value one if survey year from that 
decade. 
18 
 1980s Value one if survey year from that 
decade. 
6 
 1990s Value one if survey year from that 
decade. 
21 
 2000s Value one if survey year from that 
decade. 
15 
Years of 
Data 
YearsData Value one if more than one year, 
zero otherwise. 
20 
Sector Education  12 
 Water and 
Sanitation 
 17 
 Garbage 
Collection 
 18 
 Urban 
Transportation
 9 
 Police  2 
 Cleaning of 
Schools 
 1 
 Transport 
Infrastructure 
 1 
Country USA  28 
 Spain  10 
 UK  3 
 Netherlands  2 
 Other 
countries 
 17 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Jurisdictions Value one if a jurisdictional unit 
is focus of analysis, zero if a 
production unit (municipal firm, 
etc.) 
30 
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Table 1. Moderator Variables Coded from the Literature Review (Continued) 
Estimation 
Methodology 
OLS  27 
 SUR  22 
 MLE  4 
 2SLS  3 
 FE  2 
 GLS  1 
 GMM  1 
Dataset 
Structure 
Cross 
Section 
 40 
 Panel  14 
 Pooled  4 
 Time series  2 
Cost function 
form 
Log linear  30 
 Linear  2 
 Translog  27 
 Quadratic  1 
Expenditure 
Data 
Expenditure Value 1 if expenditure data used for 
dependent variable, 0 if cost data 
18 
Output Data Physical 
Output 
Value 1 if a measure of physical 
output is used, 0 if population used 
as a proxy for output. 
53 
Dummies for 
Elasticity 
Positive 
Elasticity 
Value 1 is the cost elasticity 
observed is > 0 
54 
 Negative 
Elasticity 
Value 1 if the cost elasticity observed 
is < 0 
6 
Production 
Method 
Production 
Method 
Value 1 if the analysis distinguishes 
between private and public 
production methods 
19 
Definition of 
EOS 
Baumol Value 1 if Baumol et al (1988) 
definition of EOS, 0 if Caves et al 
(1984) 
54 
 
 
The model specification also included moderators that should allow us to control for 
important econometric considerations. We coded papers by the year of their publication 
and the year of the survey. These are potentially important moderator that may absorb 
variations in the values of our dependent variable due to changes in productive 
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technology. In some sectors, technological advances have been offering greater flexibility 
of production (i.e. possibilities for diversification with relatively lower levels for 
production) with lower relative fixed capital investment requirements, which may have 
reduced somewhat the potential for economies of scale if total costs of production are 
considered. From that point of view, earlier analysis may show greater potential for 
economies of scale that latter ones.   
 
Secondly, we coded the number of years for which data was available in each study and 
the total number of observations. These variables attempt to measure study size and the 
robustness of results. Another important control variable that has been coded is the 
service that is the focus of the study. As discussed in our theoretical framework, we 
would expect to find greater economies of scale in more capital intensive services such as 
urban transportation, or water supply and sanitation, where spreading fixed costs among 
larger clienteles could lead to lower average costs.  
d. Funnel Plot Analysis 
“Funnel plots are a visual tool for investigating publication and other bias in meta-
analysis” (Sterne & Harbord, 2004; p.127). Publication bias exists when the probability 
of a study being published is higher if it reports statistically significant results (Bom & 
Ligthart, 2009). The term funnel plot is drawn from the “inverted funnel” shape that the 
scatter plot of the variable of interest and a measure of study size takes in the absence of 
publication bias.  
 
In our meta-analysis, each point in the funnel plots presented below depicts a particular 
study’s value of the cost elasticity of production in the horizontal axis, and its standard 
error (or inverted degrees of freedom when so stated) as the measure of study size in the 
vertical axis. If the sample of 60 observations (from 44 studies) considered in this meta-
analysis does not display publication bias, we should expect the data points representing 
the studies of smaller size (larger standard error) to scatter widely at the bottom of the 
funnel, whereas those studies with the smaller standard error (or lower value of the 
inverse degrees of freedom) will concentrate at the top around the “true” effect value.  
 
The sample unconditional mean is .735, reflecting some economies of scale in principle, 
with a minimum value of cost elasticity of output of -.245 and a maximum of 1.524. 
Thus, observations range from large economies of scale to sizable decreasing returns to 
scale, as can be seen in Table 1 below.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Cost Elasticity of Output 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All  60 .735 .375 -.245 1.524 
Education 12 .447 .522 -.183 1.524 
Garbage 
Collection 
18 .905 . 178 .272 1.091 
Water and 
Sanitation 17       .729 .319 -.245     1.086 
 
In Figure 1 below, Chart 1 displays the first funnel plot, where all 44 observations for 
which we have standard errors reported are plotted. They include observations for most 
of the services considered and all the functional forms of the cost function reviewed.  The 
plug in routine for Stata-generated funnel plots calculates the fixed effects meta-estimate, 
which determines the position of the solid vertical line of the chart. The dependent 
variable is the cost elasticity of output and the independent variable the standard error of 
the coefficient. This is a weighted average where the weights represent the inverse 
variance of the estimate. The discontinuous lines that form the inverted “funnel” 
represent the 95% confidence limits around the summary treatment effects. It is important 
to underline that the fixed effects estimate obtained from the funnel plots does not include 
any of the moderator variables that will be used later on in the meta-regression.    
 
The funnel plot on Chart 1 presents a twin-peak structure that is relatively uncommon in 
meta-analysis. A first group of studies with relatively low standard errors concentrate 
around a value of 1 for the cost elasticity of output, signaling from limited returns to scale 
or slight diseconomies of scale. A second peak is found around the value 0 of cost 
elasticity of output, signaling relatively large economies of scale with similarly small 
standard errors. This latter group of studies is considerably smaller in number though. 
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Only 11 observations out of the 44 for which standard errors are available in our sample 
reported a cost elasticity of output below 0.5.  In this group, 6 of those observations 
corresponded to studies in the education sector, and 8 of them used a log-linear function 
to model the cost function.  
 
 
  Chart 1. All observations with reported standard errors. Chart 2. All obs. Weighted by Inverse of the degrees of freedom. 
 
Figure 5. Funnel Plot Analysis.  
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Chart 3. Observations using log-linear functions Chart 4. Observations using translog functions 
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The remaining 33 observations in the sample with standard errors reported included 17 
observations on the garbage sector, 8 in the water supply and sanitation and 3 in the area 
of urban transport. The studies’ unit of analysis is mostly jurisdictional units (23), 22 of 
them use cross sectional data, 12 assume a translog cost functional form and 13 of them 
took place in the USA.  
 
The inclusion in the funnel plot analysis of those observations that do not report standard 
errors does not change significantly the results (see Chart 2). In this chart, the measure of 
size used is the inverse of the degrees of freedom, a common alternative to the individual 
standard errors. The pattern is somewhat less clear, although the two-peak structure is 
also identifiable around values of the cost elasticity coefficient of 1 and 0. Neither funnel 
plot (Charts 1 and 2) presents the symmetrical distribution that would signal absence of 
publication bias. The large heterogeneity among the studies and services analyzed 
prevents this. The first two funnel plots, in addition, do not allow us to establish the 
direction of the publication bias, and thus additional quantitative analysis will be 
undertaken to test for it in the next section.    
 
We can however look more closely at the drivers of the so called “twin peak” distribution 
obtained from the general funnel plots. As discussed, it would seem to be partially 
determined by the distribution of studies using a log-linear function as the modeling 
framework for the estimation of costs. Chart 3 above shows the funnel plot obtained from 
the representation of just such studies. The two peaks around the 1 and 0 values of the 
cost elasticity of output dependent variable are clearly identifiable.   
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This compares with a completely different distribution of studies that use the translog 
function as the modeling framework for the estimation of production costs. In Chart 4 we 
can observe that those studies report, in general, very low standard errors and, although 
the funnel shape that would indicate absence of publication bias is also absent, values of 
the cost elasticity coefficient gather in the interval 0.5 to 1. 
 
In terms of the sectoral distribution of observations, it would seem that the results from 
studies on the economies of scale of education services may be leading the overall 
distribution of observations towards the two-peaked structure observed. Figure 2 below 
depicts the funnel plots for the four sectors that contain the largest numbers of 
observations, namely education, garbage collection, water supply and sanitation and 
urban transportation. These four sector account for 55 out of the 60 observations in the 
sample. As we mentioned, a total of six observations from studies on education reported 
cost elasticity coefficients lower than 0.5 (Chart 5), while only one observation each for 
garbage collection and water supply report such levels of elasticity.  
 
Chart 5. Observations on the Education sector Chart 6. Observations on the Garbage Collection sector 
 
Chart 7. Observations on the Water Supply and Sanitation Chart 8. Observations on the Urban Transportation sector 
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Figure 6. Funnel Plot Analysis – Sectoral Distribution. 
 
68 
 
Chart 6 above, depicting the funnel plot for observations on the garbage collection sector, 
offers the single-peaked, well-behaved funnel plot distribution that presumes absence of 
publication bias. Most of the observations are within the 95% confidence interval defined 
by the funnel, and the “true” value of the cost elasticity of output in this particular sector 
seems to be defined at around 0.9.  The plots for the water supply and urban 
transportation sector show also a relatively standard distribution (meaning single peaked, 
with most of the observations contained within the 95% confidence interval of the 
inverted funnel) of observations.  
 
Thus we can conclude that the double peaked plot obtained in Chart 1 is driven by the 
observations from studies in the education sector which yield values of the cost elasticity 
of output close to 0, signaling sizable economies of scale. Among those observations, a 
log-linear form for the estimation of the cost function was primarily used. This may have 
important implications for our meta-regression analysis to which we turn next.  
 
2.5 Meta- regression analysis 
 
a. Testing for Publication Bias 
In this section we test for publication bias estimating the equation; 
 
ߠ෠௜ ൌ  ߠ଴ ൅  ෍ ߚ௝ݔ௜௝
ே
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First, we test for publication bias under the assumption of homogeneity among studies. 
Thus, we do not include in our meta-regression any of the moderator variables identified 
during the coding process. If the only differences between studies are due to sampling 
error (“within study” heterogeneity), then the fixed effects estimation would be the 
adequate estimation methodology. If however large “between study” heterogeneity is 
expected, then we should consider the use of random effects estimation to account for 
both sources of heterogeneity. The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 below. 
 
 
Table 3. Fixed Effects - Publication bias analysis. 
 No PB Linear PB Non Linear PB 
  Uni-directional Bidirectional Uni-directional Bidirectional 
Cost 
Elasticity of 
Output 
.713***    
(.121) 
.717***  
(.142) 
.723***    
(.139) 
.715***    
(.125) 
.721***    
(.125) 
α  -2.996    
(14.94) 
 -17.425   
(36.859) 
 
αp   11.071     
(16.003) 
 -3.381 
(65.689) 
αn   -118.491***    
(31.874) 
 -6129.188**    
(2947.902) 
R2 0.762 0.762 0.793 0.762 0.773 
N 44 44 44 44 44 
Q-test of 
Heterogeneit
y 
(d.f. 43) 
4806.57***      
I2 – 
Variation 
due to 
“between 
study” 
heterogeneit
y 
99.1%     
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Table 4. Random Effects - Publication bias analysis. 
 No PB Linear PB Non Linear PB 
  Uni-directional Bidirectional Symmetric Uni-directional Bidirectional Symmetric 
Cost 
Elasticity 
of Output 
.696*** 
(.058) 
.778***    
(.103) 
.813***     
(.071) 
 .721***    
(.069) 
.764***    
(.053) 
 
α  -1.157  
(1.200) 
  -3.469  
(4.788)   
  
αp   -.164 
(.881) 
  -7.943  
(16.348) 
 
αn   -10.346***   
(1.532) 
  -658.829***   
(145.934) 
 
I2 
Residual 
0.987 0.9913 0.9859  0.9913 0.9908  
N 44 44 44  44 44  
F-test of 
symmetry 
in PB:  
αp = -αn 
       
 
In Table 2 we present the fixed effects estimates of the model assuming homogeneity 
between studies. Our estimate of cost elasticity of output under this assumption is 
somewhat smaller than the simple average for all estimates. From the results, it would 
seem that the literature may have favored the publication of studies that reported negative 
cost elasticity of output, signaling large economies of scale in public good provision. As 
we have seen, most of these studies belong to the area of education. The fixed effects 
estimates are however compromised by the large amount of between-study heterogeneity 
observed from the Q-test11. In addition, the I2 test shows that 99.1% of the heterogeneity 
found in the sample is due to “between-study” differences. 
 
Due to the large heterogeneity among studies (i.e. several sectors, modeling frameworks, 
etc.), random effects estimation is recommended, and results are offered in Table 3. The 
estimates reported in Table 3 confirm the nature and the direction of the publication bias, 
with studies reporting negative values of cost elasticity of output driving the “true” 
average value in our sample. 
 
The estimations presented in Tables 2 and 3 however explain a small amount of the 
between study variation (an average of 30%). We therefore turn to the analysis of the 
case where we allow for observed heterogeneity between studies with the insertion of 
moderator variables in the meta-regression. In line with (Harbord & Higgings, 2008; 
p.497) and our earlier results, we do not estimate the fixed effects meta-regression, as 
                                                            
11 The Q-test is a common measure of heterogeneity used in the literature. It is the sum of 
the squared deviations of each study’s effect estimate from the overall effect estimate 
(Huedo-Medina, Marin-Martinez, Sanchez-Meca, & Botella, 2006).  
73 
 
such estimation assumes that “all heterogeneity can be explained by the covariates”, 
leading to excessive type I errors in cases (as ours) or unobserved heterogeneity. In the 
random effects model the weights used in the weighted least squares estimation include 
not only the standard errors of each individual observation, but the between study 
variance, estimated by the algorithm beforehand.  
 
In the first column of Table 4 we present the random effects estimation of the model with 
observed heterogeneity. The first column in Table 4 presents estimates without testing for 
publication bias, while the second and third columns include the publication bias test in 
its linear and non-linear form respectively. This first set of results offer interesting 
insights as to the determinants of the estimations found in the empirical literature of the 
cost elasticity of output. The first relevant result is the value of the conditional mean of 
the cost elasticity of output. In principle, due to the larger amount of “between-study 
heterogeneity” explained under the linear publication bias test (column 2 of Table 4), it 
would seem that such estimation presents the better fit for the model. The coefficient on 
the constant variable, the conditional mean of the sample, is 1.026, signaling constant 
economies of scale for works published in the 2000s, in sectors other than education and 
garbage collection, that used predominantly the Cobb-Douglas form approach to the cost 
production function, used cost data as opposed to expenditure figures and population as a 
proxy for output. The non-linear publication bias test yields a conditional mean of the 
cost elasticity of output of 0.829, signaling some economies of scale. The results, using 
studies published in the last decade as the reference group, also show large variations in 
the value of the conditional mean depending on the inclusion of the publication bias test. 
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Once we control for bidirectional publication bias, the estimates of the cost elasticity of 
output increase substantially, lowering the extent of economies of scale.  
 
Our time dummies show that, having the 2000s as reference group, estimates of 
economies of scale seem to have been greater in the 1980s (a period in which the 
sophistication of the analyses increases considerably with the generalization of log linear 
function estimations and the first contributions using translog cost functions).  This effect 
however falls considerably later on the estimates of the cost elasticity of output are 
similar in size between the 1990s and the 2000s. Despite the robustness in the sign of this 
relationship, the results are not statistically significant. We thus find no solid support for 
the hypothesis that modern production methods, enjoying “leaner” technologies and 
lower requirements in terms of capital investment, offer lower potential for economies of 
scale.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Meta-regression results – Random Effects Estimation 
 No PB Test PB Linear  
Bidirectional Test  
PB Non-Linear 
Bidirectional 
Test 
Constant .710***    
(.259)   
1.026*** 
(.239) 
.829*** 
(.250) 
1970s .175 
(.122) 
.067 
(.106) 
.123 
(.117) 
1980s -.319 
(.220) 
-.305 
(.186) 
-.326 
(.207) 
1990s -.071 
(.145) 
-.084 
(.124) 
-.098 
(.138) 
Education -.888***    
(.223)     
-.719*** 
(.202) 
-.811*** 
(.216) 
Garbage Collection .328*    
(.166)      
.247* 
(.144) 
.285* 
(.157) 
Translog Cost 
Function 
.397**    
(.151)      
.243* 
(.139) 
.328** 
(.145) 
Expenditure Data .547***    
(.148)      
.434*** 
(.129) 
.519*** 
(.140) 
Physical Output -.305**    
(.145)     
-.285** 
(.126) 
-.285** 
(.137) 
Baumol -.197 
(.170)     
-.216  
(.145) 
-.206 
(.162) 
Multiple 
Observations 
.269*    
(.148)      
.170  
(.128) 
.211 
(.142) 
αp  -1.504* 
(.831) 
-16.6 
(14.4) 
αn  -6.16*** 
(1.598) 
-285.09** 
(127.3) 
Number of 
Observations  
44 44 44 
Residual Variation 
due to 
Heterogeneity 
96.74% 96.87 96.87% 
Proportion of 
Between Study 
Variance Explained 
60.95% 73.51% 66% 
τ2  (Between study 
Variance) 
0.056 0.038 0.049 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Our initial hypotheses regarding sectoral distribution of economies of scale are 
confronted with opposing empirical evidence. Among the critical sectors analyzed, 
education consistently displayed a negative and highly significant coefficient in different 
model specifications. Economies of scale seem to be potentially greater in the education 
sector despite the presumption that this service displays a more labor intensive production 
method and even after other moderator variables are included in the analysis. Studies 
analyzing economies of scale in the garbage and collection sector (an assumed capital 
intensive sector) displayed lower higher cost elasticities of output, leading to smaller 
economies of scale although the results were not statistically significant. Results for the 
water and sanitation sector were not found significant either in alternative model 
specifications.  
 
Greater sophistication in the modeling of production costs leads to smaller estimates of 
economies of scale. The use of the translog function has in the literature, all things equal, 
led to higher estimates of cost elasticity of output. Acknowledging that the translog 
functions offers substantial advantages in the study of economies of scale, we must 
conclude that the use of log linear (Cobb-Douglas based) functional forms for the 
estimation of economies of scale may have led to the overestimation of economies of 
scale across the board. 
 
The bias introduced in the analysis of economies of scale by the use of inadequate 
measures of output is made obvious from the results. The use of expenditure data, as 
opposed to cost data, increases substantially the estimates of cost elasticity of output, thus 
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reducing the perceived potential of economies of scale. As discussed, the use of 
expenditure data as a proxy for production costs introduces distortions in the analysis, as 
expenditure data includes administrative items not necessarily related to the production of 
services. In addition, the use of physical output instead of population as a proxy for 
production proved to be critically important for the results obtained. As expected, more 
accurate (physical) measures of output led to larger estimates of economies of scale in the 
literature.  
 
Lastly, the meta-regression results showed no impact from the use of different definitions 
of economies of scale (i.e. Baumol or Caves), which is a positive sign of the consistency 
of our sample and offers some relief as to the possible distortion introduced by the 
heterogeneity in the measurement of our dependent variable. The results also show that 
studies with multiple observations may tend to report greater estimates of cost elasticity 
of output, that is, smaller economies of scale, although the significance of the coefficients 
was not robust to different model specifications.  
 
Several other variables were included in earlier model specifications but were found not 
significant. Country dummies were consistently found not significant. Their introduction 
as moderators in some cases was even pernicious as they could display high correlation 
with other moderators (for instance, 9 of the 10 observations from Spain come from 
studies in the garbage collection sector, creating multicollinearity between the country 
and the sectoral dummy). Individual significance tests also recommended their 
elimination from the sample with no loss of explanatory value. Equally non significant 
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proved to be the variables identifying the structure of the dataset used in the study (i.e. 
cross-sections, panel, etc.), and the estimation method (i.e. OLS, SUR, etc.). Among 
other reasons, high correlation was found as expected between the variables measuring 
the dataset structure, the estimation methodologies, and the form of the cost function, so 
most had to be discarded from the final specification. The results presented in Table 4 
were robust to the inclusion of these variables. 
 
It would seem that our results are greatly determined by the studies obtained from the 
area of education. From Table 1 we can observe that the mean cost elasticity of output in 
the sector of education is the lowest among the three main sectoral groups of 
observations. From Chart 5 in Figure 2 above we also notice that most of the observations 
reporting negative, or low cost elasticity of output are obtained from studies in the 
education sector. Thus, in order to test the robustness of our results to sectoral patterns, 
we estimate alternative model specifications excluding alternatively each of the three 
sectors for which the largest number of observations is obtained (i.e. education, garbage 
collection and water and sanitation). For simplicity, only selected variables are reported. 
Table 6. Sectoral Disaggregation – Random Effects Estimation 
 (1) Without Education (2) Without Water and 
Sanitation 
(3) Without Garbage 
Constant .631** 
(.256) 
.645** 
(.246) 
-.648 
(.448) 
(1) Garbage 
Collection 
(2) Education 
(3) Water and 
Sanit. 
.553*** 
(.182) 
-1.171*** 
(.150) 
.021 
(.192) 
Translog Cost 
Function 
.468*** 
(.162) 
.442*** 
(.130) 
.440** 
(.189) 
Expenditure Data .383** 
(.167) 
.623*** 
(.124) 
.457** 
(.224) 
Physical Output -.155 
(.148) 
-.389*** 
(.113) 
.617*** 
(.202) 
Baumol -.078 
(.169) 
.095 
(.190) 
-.231 
(.203) 
Multiple Observations -.070 
(.179) 
.492*** 
(.119) 
.612** 
(.227) 
Number of 
Observations  
48 43 42 
Residual Variation due 
to Heterogeneity 
97.84% 84.15% 89.97% 
Proportion of Between 
Study Variance 
Explained 
39.57% 78.29% 58.86% 
τ2  (Between study 
Variance) 
.048 .033 .073 
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As we can see, the significance and robustness of the results obtained in Table 4 do not 
seem to be affected by any particular sector. The exclusion of, alternatively, education, 
water and sanitation and garbage from the estimations changes substantially the constant 
and sectoral coefficients, but other determinants of the results remain significant. The use 
of the translog function continues to determine results and leads to lower estimates of 
economies of scale, as it is the case with the use of expenditure over cost data. As 
expected, variation is wider when the coefficient on physical output area considered as 
we alternatively eliminate sectors from the analysis, as the variable is substantially more 
correlated with the sectoral studies (i.e. education studies use population as their measure 
of output). 
 
In order to provide a more complete picture, our estimation analysis also included 
initially the estimation of sector-specific meta-regressions for those sectors with 
sufficient observations (garbage and water supply and sanitation). As expected however, 
little variation is found among the most critical moderators within a particular sector, 
which turns the analysis worthless in our particular context. As our main goal is to 
estimate the potential for economies of scale in the case of jurisdictional consolidation, 
sector specific results were not critical to our conclusions.  
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
Jurisdictional consolidation policies across the world have been justified by invoking the 
existence of economies of scale in the delivery of local public services that would allow 
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reducing average costs of production for larger “client” bases. Our first review of the 
empirical literature shows however that evidence of such economies of scale is 
inconclusive, with multiple studies reporting constant or decreasing returns to scale in a 
variety of services. Our meta-analysis systematizes the wide range of empirical 
approaches and modeling frameworks found in this literature and helps identify the study 
determinants behind the results found.  
 
At best, the inclusion of studies from several sectors in our analysis seems to confirm the 
presence of moderately increasing to constant returns to scale in the provision of local 
services. The potential for economies of scale seems to differ greatly at least across three 
traditional services, education water and sanitation and garbage, being highest for 
education and lowest for garbage collection. The analysis also offers guidelines as to 
future empirical endeavors in this area. Physical output and production cost data should 
be used, together with translog approximations to the modeling of cost functions.  
 
The estimates of economies of scale selected for our meta-regression are those at the 
mean of the sample distribution of each study. As such, our analysis does not offer 
insights as to the extent and length of those economies of scale. However, it is unlikely 
that, in the context of U-shaped long average cost functions, such economies of scale will 
be pervasive well beyond the average production point. From the point of view of 
jurisdictional consolidation and assuming a situation of population growth, consolidation 
that brings production levels near the lowest long term average cost levels should expect 
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the gains from economies of scale to slowly disappear assuming no changes to 
production technology in the short term.  
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CHAPTER 3.  
JURISDICTIONAL FRAGMENTATION AND ITS DETERMINANTS: 
A CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERNATIONAL STUDY 
“The need for more counties had a pragmatic value in the early days of the 
commonwealth. People lived in isolated communities or on farms far removed from the 
county seats. (…) Citizen’s naturally wanted to be at least within a day’s ride of their 
country seat.” (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2005) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Considering the limited (and service-specific) evidence on economies of scale on local 
service delivery available from the empirical literature, it is surprising to observe how 
often programs of jurisdictional consolidation across the world have been justified upon 
that assumption. As it was perhaps to be expected, such forced consolidation programs 
have yielded mixed results (Dollery & Robotti, 2009). The international experience 
seems to show that countries around the world are opting instead for adapting to high 
levels of jurisdictional fragmentation while encouraging the creation of new institutional 
modes for service delivery (e.g. special districts, inter-municipal cooperation, home 
owners associations, etc.).  
 
The observed proliferation of new collective decision making mechanisms for local 
service delivery may be an indirect reflection of the limited size and specificity of the 
available economies of scale. It may also be symptomatic of the fact that, even when 
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economies of scale can be obtained, a preference for political accountability, as discussed 
in the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 1, leads to a smaller (i.e. less than 
optimal from an economies of scale perspective) average size of local governments. The 
latter concept of political accountability is defined as the voters’ capacity to influence the 
election (or re-election) of local representatives, and presumably this capacity is greater 
in smaller jurisdictions. 
As pointed out, forced consolidation has often failed to live up to the efficiency gains 
expected from the start of those policy decisions. Experiences in some countries (e.g., 
Canada) show that total government costs after consolidation may actually have 
increased, at least in the short term (Sancton, 2008). Several reasons are behind those 
results. For a start, it is difficult to retrench public servants due to labor agreements, 
which would lead to duplication of staffing in the new, consolidated jurisdiction. 
Secondly, once the municipalities are consolidated, it is generally the case that the 
salaries of the public servants are brought up (or equalized) to the higher level observed 
pre-merger in the merging municipalities (Deller, 1998), which would further increase 
overall labor costs. In any case it would appear that the relationship between 
fragmentation and inefficiency is not yet fully established (Dowding & Mergoupis, 
2003).  
In addition, municipal or regional jurisdictional mergers can face considerable political 
opposition and institutional friction, even if one could reasonably expect efficiency gains 
from the merger and larger jurisdictional size. This may explain why, for example in 
Peru, a 2008 recent law on municipal mergers, which provides large fiscal incentives to 
consolidation in the form of grants to the jurisdictions merged over a period of 15 years, 
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has not been able to usher a single merger process. In another example, in Spain, a highly 
fragmented country with over 8,000 municipal governments, jurisdictional consolidation 
has also encountered strong political opposition at the local level, even when no 
distinguishable preferences over service delivery are observed among the merging 
municipalities or even when good evidence of potential for economies of scale exist 
(Bosch & Suarez-Pandiello, 2008).  
The cases of Peru, Spain, and perhaps other countries, offer anecdotal evidence that 
forces other than the traditional economic theory postulates might be influencing the 
determination of the level of jurisdictional fragmentation in a country. To be sure, these 
other causes are likely to be complex and likely also to be intertwined, with reasons 
ranging from simple political turf and selfishness of local politicians, to more serious 
issues of representation and accountability and heterogeneity. Advancing in this 
knowledge is the main theme of this chapter and to do so from an international 
perspective. To our knowledge, to date, there does not exit a rigorous study analyzing the 
cross-country determinants of fragmentation in the way this issue has been previously 
analyzed for some particular countries.  
Our challenge in this chapter is to search for common determinants of fragmentation 
across countries that may help better explain variations in the vertical structure of 
government in terms of the numbers of tiers of governments (i.e. the number of sub-
national level governments in a country) and the number of jurisdictions in each tier (i.e. 
total number and also relative to population and area). At the outset, the country fixed 
effects of such an analysis are expected to be large and powerful, but not necessarily 
overwhelming. In addition to measuring fragmentation using the traditional indicators in 
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the literature (i.e. number of governments relative to population and surface), we will 
evaluate a dimension of fragmentation that has gone relatively unexplained: the number 
of tiers of government in a given country.  
The levels of jurisdictional fragmentation around the world, as it is to be expected, vary 
widely. In Chart 3.1 below we show the number of sub-national levels of government (in 
addition to the central government tier). As it can be observed, 10 countries in our sample 
of 197 report having four tiers of sub-national level governments, while 50 report three. 
More than 50 percent of the countries in our sample have two sub-national levels of 
government, including countries vastly different in terms of population, ethnic 
composition, etc.  
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Figure 7. Sub-national Government tiers per country.  
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Equally, the absolute number of sub-national jurisdictions per country ranges widely in 
our sample, from a minimum of 0 in Kiribati (only a central level government) to a 
maximum of over 240,000 in India (including the Gram panchayat level of government. 
The median value is situated at 194. Chart 3.2 offers additional information on the 
distribution of the sample in terms of the absolute number of jurisdictions. 
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Figure 8. Number of sub-national jurisdictions per country.  
 
A total of 42 countries in our sample report more than one thousand sub-national 
jurisdictions including all sub-national tiers of government. A similar number of 
countries (51) report less than 50 jurisdictions in total. As it is suggested by the 
correlations presented in Table 3.1, the total number of jurisdictions is highly correlated 
to the country’s population, not so much with the geographical area. Overall levels of 
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income inequality, GDP pc and human development do not seem to be correlated with 
the level of jurisdictional fragmentation. 
 
Table 7. Correlations: Number of jurisdictions and selected sample variables.  
 Number Jurisdictions Population Area 
Gini 
Coefficient GDP pc HDI 
Number of 
Jurisdictions 1      
Population 0.74 1     
Area 0.25 0.44 1    
Gini -0.04 0.02 0.09 1   
GDP pc -0.02 -0.06 0.08 -0.48 1  
Human 
Development 
Index 
-0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.41 0.76 1 
 
 
From our theoretical model we have concluded that Oates' (1972) traditional model of 
optimal jurisdictional size would seem to predict larger average jurisdictional size (and 
thus lower fragmentation) than our extended model which adds preferences for political 
accountability to the utility function of individual residents.  
 
But before we get into the chapter, we must recall that Oates’ model does not predict 
government size, but group size (i.e. in a way Oates’ model equates population with 
jurisdiction size). In this sense Oates’ model may be misleading when Oates (1972) 
identifies groups with local governments (or municipalities), and later on argues that 
economies of scale in production can be achieved via other institutional arrangements 
(service contracts, cooperation, etc.). Moreover, Oates’ model refers exclusively to the 
cost (in efficiency terms) of collective decision making among groups, and it does not 
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incorporate the cost of transactions from inter-government coordination or cooperation. 
Thus Oates’s model is helpful in that it outlines some of the most important tradeoffs of 
the process of assignment of functions across government levels, but it does not explain 
the observed level of government fragmentation since it does not deal with governments, 
but with groups.  
 
The question we still want to look at is thus: what are the determinants of the current 
level of fragmentation observed across countries and how does this level relate to the 
predictions of our standard model? The relevance of this analysis lies in the often-cited 
inefficient size of local governments, especially in developing countries. But once we 
better understand what may be behind the level of fragmentation, would we remain 
surprised about the current status quo with the observed local government fragmentation 
across so many countries?  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we offer a review of the 
literature on government fragmentation, while section 3 outlines the empirical models 
proposed to approach the analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation. Section 4 presents the 
results from our estimations and concluding comments are offered in section 5.    
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3.2 A review of the literature on government fragmentation and its 
implications 
 
The level of government fragmentation has important implications for an array of issues. 
For instance, from a public choice perspective it is argued that more efficient 
governments (essentially defined as smaller government budgets) are expected from 
increased competition among local governments (Niskanen, 1975; Brennan & Buchanan, 
1980). There is some empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. In particular, 
Sjoquist (1982) finds that expenditures per capita in the southern metropolitan regions of 
the USA decrease as the number of jurisdictions increases. Pressure to reduce 
government spending seemed to be behind recent drives for municipal amalgamation in 
Canada as well (Sancton, 2008).  
The theoretical foundations for the potential benefits to be derived from sub-national 
government fragmentation can be traced back to Tiebout's (1956) seminal proposition 
that citizens “vote with their feet” and chose the mix of services and taxes that best 
represent their preferences. Assuming adequate supply of local governments (which 
assumes away the problem of fragmentation but it implies it), equilibrium is reached 
when each citizen maximizes the welfare obtained from the mix of goods and services 
provided by the local government, net of tax payments. Thus, a sufficient number of 
governments offering distinguishable tax and expenditure packages would be required for 
this efficient sorting of individuals. From this point of view, certain level of 
fragmentation would be efficiency-enhancing, since a diversity of preferences requires a 
diversity of government service packages.  
91 
 
Empirical evidence on this issue is, again, mixed. Feld, Kirchgässner, & Schaltegger 
(2003) find no evidence that fragmentation affects the size (in terms of expenditure 
budgets) of Swiss cantons. In fact, earlier contributions of the literature have tended to 
suggest that augmenting the number of governments may lead to increases in the overall 
size of the public sector. This is likely to occur especially if economies of scale in public 
administration are foregone with greater decentralization (Oates, 1991), or if citizens’ 
control over local bureaucracies translates into a wider range of services being provided 
(Zax, 1989). Among other reasons, this “larger public sector” results have been justified 
under the assumption of a lower quality of bureaucrats at the local government level, 
leading to poorer expenditure management and higher costs for services (Prud'homme, 
1995). On the other hand, a recent cross-country study by Martinez-Vazquez & Yao 
(2009) argues that the total public sector employment grows with fiscal decentralization, 
as increases in employment at the sub-national level more than offset declines at the 
central government level.  
From an equity point of view, higher fragmentation has been suggested to lead to the 
separation of tax bases among rich and poor. Richer areas (such as suburban residential 
areas) have a clear incentive to separate from impoverished urban areas that are 
subsidized with the revenues collected from their tax bases. The end result of such 
motivated fragmentation may be higher inequalities in the provision of services. A highly 
fragmented local government level may also lead to more self-centered governments in 
term of policy issues; reducing the incentives for coordination among jurisdictions to 
maximize overall welfare levels (Lewis, 1998). Earlier contributions seem to show, 
however, that higher income voters may be supportive of redistributive programs if they 
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expect to obtain long term utility gains (such as overall increases in property values in the 
jurisdiction) (Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 1981).  
The concept of fragmentation is not easily operationalized. The literature has favored a 
measure of the number of local governments relative to the size of the territory (either in 
terms of area or population) (Nelson, 1990). However, the range of overlapping 
authorities over the same territory (as ultimately, the institutional form chosen to deliver 
the public good or service may take several forms) adds an extra complication to the 
estimation of local government fragmentation levels.  Optimal government size, Ostrom, 
Tiebout, & Warren (1999) argued, may depend on the nature of the public good provided 
and not just on the preferences of local consumers, leading to “polycentrism”, or a system 
of multiple collective decision-making mechanisms. Socio-spatial studies have termed 
this process “state rescaling”, a redefinition of the role of government at all levels, 
including the involvement of non-governmental agencies in public service delivery, the 
allocation of further competencies through decentralization to sub-national levels of 
government and the assumption of former national competencies by supra-national 
institutions. In line with this argument, Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev (2008) find that 
the trend towards decentralization observed over the last decades has not affected, on 
average, the size of government, and offer empirical evidence of significant and positive 
relationships between globalization, decentralization and government size. 
Whereas there is a shortage of contributions exploring the determinants of the observed 
high fragmentation of local government across the world,12 the literature is rich in 
                                                            
12 In addition, most of them are U.S. based, with some experiences from Canada and 
Australia as well.  
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contributions exploring the effect of fragmentation on economic growth, urban sprawl 
and other topics of economic interest. Nelson & Foster (1999) argue that in the 
framework of metropolitan areas in the US, as decision making becomes more 
fragmented (more local governments are present), growth in personal income declines. 
This is related to the fact that annexation of suburban areas is largely behind the increase 
in income growth of metropolitan areas, which are favored by their consolidation with 
affluent suburbs.  Measures of sprawl used in the literature, very concentrated in the U.S. 
experience on the other hand, include population density (as an indication of low-density 
development), the percentage of dwellings in single-unit detached houses, or housing 
units per square kilometer. In one of the few studies that analyses the plausible reverse 
causation between fragmentation and urban sprawl, Razin & Rosentraub (2000) conclude 
that residential sprawl impacts positively on fragmentation, but fragmentation does not 
have a predictable effect on sprawl. Important results from their analysis include the 
confirmation that higher population density is a significant predictor of lower 
fragmentation, and that the age of the metropolitan area is a prominent variable predicting 
fragmentation13.  
Empirical analyses of the level of fragmentation of the vertical structure of government 
are scarce perhaps due also to the difficulties in operationalizing our variable of interest.. 
                                                            
13 Discussion on the causality for this effect is however insufficient in Razin and 
Rosentraub’s analysis. Their age variable measures metropolitan areas that were already 
large in 1940, and thus less affected by the impact of the widespread use of automobiles 
on urban planning. Denser areas however would be expected to be less fragmented in 
light of previous findings; whereas Razin and Rosentraub find that older (and thus denser 
in their context) areas are more fragmented.  
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However, this topic has not gone unattended in the literature. We review below the 
available evidence on the determinants of government fragmentation.  
a. Do heterogeneous local preferences lead to greater fragmentation? 
As discussed in the previous chapter, evidence in support of the economies of scale that 
would suggest the need for larger size governments is hard to find. Can we assume that 
the other element of the tradeoff proposed by Oates (1972), that efficiency gains are 
attained from tailoring local public good provision to local preferences, is granted? If so, 
are heterogeneous preferences behind the observed fragmentation of local government? 
The measurement of preferences has traditionally been more difficult than the 
measurement of costs. However, there have been some successes in the attempt to 
operationalize the heterogeneity of preferences in the economic literature. In his seminal 
contribution to the study of the determinants of government fragmentation in the U.S.A., 
Nelson (1990) shows that the number of jurisdictions is positively correlated with the 
degree of heterogeneity of individual preferences, measured by income dispersion and 
age dispersion (i.e. more income and age dispersion leads to a higher number of 
governments). This finding is well aligned with the decentralization postulates laid out by 
Oates (1972). If the efficiency gains from better tailoring public good provision to 
smaller groups make up for the loss of economies of scale, then we would expect higher 
levels of group fragmentation (and thus smaller government sizes). Nelson’s analysis 
uses all types of governments from the U.S. Census, including both elected governments 
and special districts. He finds that the latter empirical relationship is stronger in the case 
of special districts than for general purpose governments, and that it may lend support to 
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the standard argument that heterogeneity of local preferences leads to smaller 
jurisdictions. Contrary to his expectations, greater racial homogeneity (assumed to be a 
reflection of lower preference heterogeneity) leads in his analysis to higher 
fragmentation, a surprising result.  
Stansel (2005) finds a direct relationship between the level of fragmentation and 
economic efficiency; he finds a positive relation between the number of local 
governments in the US relative to population, and the level of economic growth. To the 
extent that local growth is achieved by the attainment of production and allocative 
efficiency gains from greater decentralization, more heterogeneous preferences would 
lead to preferences for greater government fragmentation. However, the theoretical 
linkages between economic growth and the decentralization of expenditure still await 
more conclusive empirical evidence (see Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2003). These 
results would be in line also with Musso (2001) who, using a sample of Californian cities, 
finds that more affluent communities (with income as a proxy for diverse preferences) in 
fast-growing counties are more likely to form new cities. Conversely, Burns (1994) 
argues that changes in the level of access and quality of local services do not explain 
local government formation, but instead tax avoidance and racial exclusion are found to 
be the most significant determinants. In line with Burns, Martinez-Vazquez, Rider, & 
Walker (1997) find that increasing racial heterogeneity of a state population increases the 
number of school districts, supposedly in order to satisfy their preference for 
disassociation.  
A different line of work, important to our analysis, has linked heterogeneity in 
preferences to further decentralization. Shelton (2007), using data from a wide sample of 
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countries finds that heterogeneity in preferences (measured by an index of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization) leads to further decentralization, measured as the share of 
local government expenditure in total government size. Decentralization is greater, 
Shelton shows, in the education and health sector, where one is more likely to find higher 
fragmentation of preferences due to social and demographic factors. In any case, greater 
decentralization (especially measured as the share of local governments on total public 
expenditure) does not necessarily translate into greater fragmentation of local 
government.  
b. Economies of scope and demands for local accountability  
The second major trade-off critical in the definition of the optimal jurisdictional size is 
that between administrative costs and local government accountability.14 If economies of 
scope are present, the joint delivery of, for instance, solid waste collection and water 
services by a supra-local level of government offers cost savings over their separate 
provision by two or more local governments. Evidence of economies of scope exists, 
especially for private sector production, but it is scant with reference to local government 
production processes. Sharing production inputs was shown to be a source of scope 
economies in the health care services sector (Grosskopf, Margaritis, & Valdmanis, 1995; 
Dollery & Fleming, 2006). Equally, Callan & Thomas (2001), in their estimation of a 
multi-product cost function for municipal waste services, find evidence of significant cost 
                                                            
14 It is argued that local government production functions present economies of scope, 
that is, that the output from the joint production of local public goods or services is 
greater than the output obtained with two separate processes, using the same amount of 
input (Panzar & Willig, 1977).  
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savings from the joint provision of recycling and disposal services; whereas Wolff (2004) 
argues that substantial economies of scope are found in the integrated management of 
River Basin systems in the US, as opposed to functional specialization. Although scarce, 
this empirical evidence extends across very different local government services, 
providing some ground to expect lower fragmentation of government due to the cost 
savings offered by joint production.  
 
Can demand for greater political accountability lead to higher fragmentation? Several 
dimensions of the concept of political accountability need to be distinguished. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, we may define political accountability as the voter’s capacity to 
influence the election (and actions) of their local representatives (Seabright, 1996). Such 
ability is expected to affect the political responsiveness to local preferences in the mix of 
public goods and services provided. This responsiveness is largely dependent on fiscal 
authority aspects such as whether powers to spend and tax have been devolved to sub-
national governments, and most importantly on whether elections are being held at the 
sub-national tiers of government and on the quality of the election systems. Thus, for 
heterogeneous preferences to lead to distinguishable mixes of public goods provided 
across jurisdictions, certain institutional foundations must be in place linking citizens 
with policy makers. 
 
The expected greater responsiveness of representatives from smaller jurisdictions to the 
preferences of their constituents is not an aspect explored by Oates in its theory of 
optimal jurisdictional size. His model is anchored in a “direct democracy system”, 
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whereby local citizens “vote” effectively on the level of public good to be provided. No 
political economy issues related to representative democracy are at play thus in Oates’ 
contribution.  
 
If representative democracy models are the setting for public good provision, then the 
principal-agent aspects of the relationship between constituents and representatives come 
into play. In this regard, following Tommasi & Weinschelbaum (1999), there may be four 
channels through which smaller jurisdictions are able to exert improved control over their 
political representatives (and thus ensure their priorities are acted upon). First, in line 
with Olson's (1965) theory of collective action, smaller jurisdictions reduce the incentives 
to free-riding (which is rendered more visible in smaller groups). Second, the existence of 
yardstick competition introduces additional benchmarks for political performance not 
easy to manipulate by local representatives. Linked to this aspect, policy diffusion models 
(Berry & Berry, 1990) would argue that local experimentation and the diffusion of best 
practices across jurisdictions may also introduce incentives and benchmarks for 
government performance.  
 
A third channel, most important to us, is the fact that physical proximity to local 
representatives allows easier access to them (i.e. reduced transaction costs) even when 
demands are not related to policy changes but simply to quick, expedite action on issues 
of citizens’ interest. County formation in several of the U.S. States, for instance, has been 
particularly determined by this. Historical records from Kentucky and Georgia for 
instance would show that county boundaries were drawn ensuring no citizen resided more 
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than a day’s ride from the county seat. Considering the strong historical inertia of 
jurisdictional formation, constituents’ proximity to local governments may have been the 
single most important determinant of jurisdictional fragmentation.  
 
In a game theoretic setting, physical proximity increases the probability of interacting in 
multiple venues, which allows for opportunities for punishment (Tommasi & 
Weinschelbaum, 1999) and thus introduces incentives for politicians to comply to 
citizens demands15. It is important to distinguish among these possible determinants of 
jurisdictional fragmentation if we attempt to explain the mounting anecdotal evidence of 
citizens’ resistance to jurisdictional consolidation in the presence of nearly identical 
preferences for public goods and certain potential for economies of scale.  
 
These aspects may be more important than any perceived gains on the (statistical) 
importance of individual votes in smaller jurisdictions. Even in small constituencies, the 
probability that a single vote will be decisive is minute. In light of the small statistical 
significance of a single vote, a large literature has developed attempting to explain why 
individuals vote at all (especially considering the cost of voting is not negligible), the so-
                                                            
15 A preference for proximity to institutions governing the management of common 
services may be behind, for example, the widespread creation of home –owner 
associations in the U.S. The latter are truly miniature local private governments providing 
services traditionally under the responsibility of county governments (such as water 
supply, garbage collection, etc.). Although the creation of such associations is due often 
to legal requirements to urban site development, they also arise spontaneously and in any 
case, have expanded enormously over the last 20 years, representing now nearly 20% of 
the American dwellers. Across the board, the services provided by these associations, and 
the characteristics of such services do not differ greatly from those previously offered by 
elected governments, and although differences can be found at the margin.  
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called “voting paradox”. Explanations have included a desire to maintain democracy 
(Downs, 1957), or even the exercise of a sense of duty (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968). The 
general conclusion of this literature is that despite the weight carried by the alternative 
explanations, the paradox remains largely unresolved (Blais & Young, 1999).     
 
Such demand for political accountability may not even translate into greater citizen 
participation in government, even though proximity to representatives may reduce the 
cost of collecting information about local policies. Although direct citizen involvement in 
participatory planning, budgeting or evaluation process may not depend on the level of 
government analyzed, the use of citizen satisfaction surveys does seem to assist budget 
development processes (Jordan & Hackbart, 1999; Melkers & Willoughby, 2005), 
informing governments’ decision on new expenditure programs (Riverbank & Kelly, 
2006). Along those lines, there seems to be substantial evidence from international 
surveys that residents show higher levels of satisfaction from the services received from 
local governments than those received from the central government (CIS, several years, 
or Dasgupta, Narayan, & Skoufias (2009) for the case of Indonesia).   
 
The literature on performance budgeting provides an alternative avenue to explore how 
accountable and responsive local governments are to citizen’s preferences and whether 
size affects the level of accountability. By explicitly defining indicators and performance 
benchmarks in their budgets, governments not only change the technology of 
accountability, but may offer a critical instrument to evaluate how close government 
actions are to local preferences, even though one can argue as to whether that was a main 
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goal of the introduction of performance based budgeting processes. A recent review of 
the literature in this area shows that the widespread implementation of performance 
budgeting measures at different levels of government in the US does not seem to have 
translated into significant changes in inter or intra-sectoral allocations (Gomez & 
Willoughby, 2008). This may reflect a lack of flexibility in adjusting expenditure patterns 
to local preferences due to largely committed, politics-driven budgets. But, it could also 
be a reflection of how time-consuming it is for citizens to collect and process government 
budgetary information. In a pioneering study, Melkers & Willoughby (2001) found that 
budgetary officials at the State level were more positive about the impact of results-based 
budgeting on states’ budgetary appropriations in the U.S. if the performance 
measurement was a requirement of the legislature (and not just of the executive).  
 
There is no clear evidence that the impact of performance measurement on budget 
formulation is greater as we move down the government hierarchy. (Melkers & 
Willoughby, 2005; p.18) find in a recent contribution to this literature that “less than 50 
percent of county and city officials agreed that performance measures were a vital 
decision aid on budgetary issues”. They find that the use of performance measures is 
more common at the county than at the municipal level. We cannot conclude, however, 
that the latter would be an indication that smaller governments are less accountable to 
their citizens. In fact, this finding could support the opposite view that because smaller 
governments are more accountable to their citizens, there is less need for the 
implementation of performance measures. 
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In summary, a review of the literature suggests that the case for economies of scope is 
relatively well documented, although the largest contribution of the literature in this area 
is concentrated on private sector production processes. We are not able to establish at this 
point a connection between higher citizen participation and greater involvement in 
budgetary processes at lower levels of government and smaller size of jurisdictions; the 
literature in this area is in a very initial state of development.  
 
c. Fragmentation versus equity in local government structures 
 
In the absence of proper fiscal equalization mechanisms, fragmentation of the local 
government structure may make the equitable delivery of public services difficult due to 
the accompanying fragmentation of fiscal bases (Warner & Hefetz, 2002). On the other 
hand, government fragmentation may allow for better access of the poor and rural 
population to services tailored to their needs, thus making the system of government 
more equitable.  
 
Academic contributions to this debate have focused on the analysis of metropolitan areas 
and especially on the fiscal comparison between central metropolitan and sub-urban 
areas. As Razin (2000; p.28) puts it, changes in local government organization “re-shape 
the rules of the game of local development and influence inter-local disparities”. On that 
line, Schneider (1986), in his study of metropolitan disparities in access to services, does 
not find support for the hypothesis that fragmentation results in higher service inequality. 
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Neither do Morgan & Mareschal (1999) who find no effect of metropolitan fragmentation 
on fiscal health.  
 
Contributions in this area have focused on cross-sectional comparisons in expenditure per 
capita versus income per capita in the major metropolitan areas of the U.S. A general 
conclusion of this literature is that fiscal fragmentation may have been favored as a 
strategy to avoid inter-jurisdictional redistribution of local fiscal bases (Ellickson, 1971; 
Lewis, 1998).  
 
d. Institutional, Demographic, and Geographical issues 
Institutional aspects that may restrict or even encourage further fragmentation have been 
also the object of empirical analysis. Nelson (1990), again focusing on the U.S. case,  
finds that tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) increase the number of special districts, 
which may be created as a way to circumvent tax limits posed upon state and county 
government by their citizens. He does not find however evidence that other self-imposed 
limits to local debt, or home rule16 clauses have any significant impact on the number of 
governments. Contrary to Nelson’s findings, Bowler & Donovan (2004; p.194) most 
recently qualified this finding, arguing that, “absent the pressure of ballot initiatives, 
TELs do not lead (in the U.S.) to an increase in the formation of new local governments”. 
In the same vein, Lewis (1998) argues that the implementation of Proposition 13, which 
imposed severe limits to the rise of property taxes in California, did not lead to an 
                                                            
16 Home rule is defined in (Nelson, 1990) as the allocation of significant autonomy to 
local governments in carrying out local functions.  
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increase in the level of local government fragmentation in the form of additional special 
districts.  
The overall size of the public sector may be an important determinant of the 
fragmentation of local government systems. This hypothesis has not been fully explored 
to date perhaps due to the endogeneity involved in its testing. For instance, Kenny & 
Schmidt (1994) find that state aid to school districts is an important determinant of the 
great consolidation of school districts observed between 1950 and 1980. They argue that 
a larger role of the state in the financing of schools reduces the capacity of districts to 
differentiate the education services provided and sort themselves on the basis of average 
income in their jurisdictions, so consolidation ensues.  
Outside main economic arguments, jurisdictional fragmentation may also (and perhaps 
most importantly) be affected by a myriad of institutional reasons such as the form of the 
state (federal vs.unitary), the form of government systems (monarchy versus republic), a 
history of decentralized government or secession of certain regions, cultural and ethnic 
issues, civil or armed conflicts, and so on. More recently, and particularly with regard to 
urban municipal consolidation processes, the desire to compete in a “global city” 
environment may have prompted metropolitan consolidation processes17.  
Demographic and geographical variables have traditionally been used as controls in the 
empirical analysis of fragmentation. Metro area population and land area are positively 
correlated and statistically significant determinants of the number of governments in 
Nelson (1990), a result partially supported in Bowler & Donovan (2004). The hypothesis 
                                                            
17 See, for example, the case of Toronto in Sancton (2004).   
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behind the inclusion of these variables is that large demographic or geographical areas 
may be more difficult to manage and thus fragmentation would be efficiency enhancing. 
Nelson’s analysis includes additionally US-specific institutional explanatory variables not 
applicable to cross-country analysis.18 
As discussed above, numerous factors may partly explain the level of government 
fragmentation encountered in a particular country. Our challenge is now to develop an 
empirical model that allows exploring the relative influence of the explanatory variables 
discussed, a task approached in the next section.  
 
3.3 Empirical Model 
 
In our theoretical model, we have argued the number of jurisdictions is a function of 
several factors, including importantly, the cost of production of services (and thus the 
potential for economies of scale), the heterogeneity of preferences, and preferences for 
political accountability, which, all things equal, led us to an equilibrium solution where 
the optimal jurisdictional size is smaller than in the case where the latter variable is not 
considered. In addition, we have discussed additional determinants of jurisdictional 
fragmentation, including institutional, geographical and demographic variables. 
 
Generically, we can represent the relationship between optimal jurisdictional size and 
these set of relevant variables as: 
 
                                                            
18 These include whether a referendum or majority approval is required for a territory to 
be annexed to a city or for the consolidation of two or more jurisdictions. 
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where, using the notation from Chapter 1, N is the jurisdictional size, C represents a 
measure of economies of scale, U(DG) depicts the level of heterogeneity of preferences 
as defined in Chapter 1, P represents preferences for political accountability and Z is a 
vector of variables including institutional, geographic and demographic factors affecting 
jurisdictional size.  
 
As discussed, the expected sign of the partial derivatives is as follows: 
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Our first task in the definition of our empirical model is to further clarify our dependent 
variable. As already noted above, operationalizing the level of government fragmentation 
is a complex task. The literature has favored absolute measures, such as the total number 
of governments, over scaling indicators, such as the average population or extension by 
jurisdiction. Conversely, the number of local governments for a certain population size 
could be used as a relative measure of fragmentation. Nelson (1990) uses in his study of 
U.S. government fragmentation the number of governments per metro area, while Bowler 
& Donovan (2004) use the number of governments (again both general and special-
purpose governments) in a state at the time of a census. In exploring the effect on 
fragmentation of Proposition 13 in California (which importantly limited revenue 
collections from the property tax), Lewis (1998) also uses total number of governments 
as his variable of interest.  
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 The use of absolute measures of government fragmentation (i.e. total number of 
governments) may be a reasonable empirical strategy when a certain level of 
jurisdictional homogeneity can be assumed within the sample, as in country case-studies. 
Our aim however is to explore these relationships within the context of as large as 
possible a sample of countries. This therefore requires a relative measure of 
fragmentation that helps homogenize to the extent possible the individual values of our 
dependent variable.  
 
First, we should clarify what is understood as “government” or jurisdiction in this 
context. In short, we include in our calculations all levels of government with service 
delivery responsibilities and all jurisdictions within each level. The rationale for such a 
criterion is that we are interested in exploring whether heterogeneity of preferences for 
public services may lead to further fragmentation so as to allow a better matching of 
preferences with service delivery. Arguably, a country may be divided in a large number 
of jurisdictions, but in the absence of elected governments with some authority over their 
budgets, public service delivery may not differ much in that system from a fully 
centralized service delivery system. The level of authority over local expenditure and 
revenue sources is, however, very hard to measure. In fact, fiscal decentralization experts 
around the world have criticized this fact as a major obstacle in the analysis of the impact 
of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, or service delivery. Acknowledging that 
the level of fiscal autonomy of sub-national government around the world varies wildly, 
it is to be expected that a jurisdiction with a locally elected government will have larger 
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authority over its budget than a similar territorial unit with de-concentrated units of the 
central government. Our analysis will control accordingly for this.  
 
Our estimation strategy is to try different specifications of the dependent variable. First, 
in line with previous contributions to the literature, we will use the total number of 
jurisdictions (from elected levels of government) as our dependent variable. However, as 
just discussed, the heterogeneity of jurisdictions and different sizes across the world 
requires the use of a relative indicator of fragmentation that allows homogenizing the 
values of our dependent variable. Thus, as derived from our theoretical model in Chapter 
1, we will use as dependent variables the ratio of population and area size to the total 
number of jurisdictions in the subsequent model specifications. To that extent, all 
jurisdictions from elected levels of government (including the central government) are 
added, and the values of the above mentioned ratios are calculated for each country.  
 
Lastly, we will also consider a rarely discussed dimension of fragmentation in the 
literature: the number of levels of government. As it is the case with other indicators of 
government fragmentation, the number of levels of government in a given country is 
likely to be correlated with the geographical size of the country and its population size. 
This is an aspect of fragmentation largely ignored in the literature, and thus we provide a 
first exploration into this issue. 
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3.3.1 Hypotheses 
 
Economies of Scale and Fragmentation  
 
In line with the standard model of optimal jurisdictional size, we would expect that the 
potential for economies of scale to be a deterrent to high government fragmentation. As 
we saw in Chapter 2, the literature has traditionally approximated the measurement of 
economies of scale in various ways. Earlier studies used population as a proxy for 
economies of scale, while more recent contributions have used either expenditure or 
production cost data. As the results from our meta-analysis show, population can be 
arguably a rough measure of potential economies of scale, leading to their 
underestimation.  
 
In the context of our analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation, using population as our 
measure of economies of scale introduces additional problems. For instance, considering 
China and Luxemburg, we would have to expect (if population were our proxy for 
economies of scale) lower relative levels of government fragmentation in China than in 
Luxemburg, since China’s large population would signal to the largest international 
potential for economies of scale. That is, obviously, not a reasonable assumption. 
Population would seem to be therefore naturally and directly related to the level of 
jurisdictional fragmentation, and it is discarded as a valid proxy for economies of scale. 
This approach is also consistent with Nelson's (1990) analysis of jurisdictional 
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fragmentation in metropolitan areas of the U.S., whereby population is included solely as 
an environmental, control variable.  
 
From the meta-analysis conducted in Chapter 2, education, urban transportation, garbage 
collection and water and sanitation, in that order, were the services that displayed (from 
the studies analyzed) the largest potential for economies of scale. Ideally, one would want 
to explore the functional assignments of our sample of countries and ascertain in which of 
them are these functions decentralized to sub-national levels of government as an 
indication of potential for economies of scale. Regrettably, few countries have formal 
statements of expenditure assignments and even where they exist, they are often no more 
than broad lists of functional responsibilities with great overlap across tiers of 
government.   In addition, collecting data on the cost elasticity of production from service 
delivery at sub-national levels of government for a sample of close to 200 countries is, 
simply, unrealistic. 
 
We are left with few straight-forward options for variables approximating the potential 
for economies of scale in public service delivery. The most comprehensive analysis of the 
determinants of fragmentation in the U.S., that of Nelson (1990) does not include a 
measure of economies of scale, a clear signal of the difficulties encountered in 
operationalizing this variable even in the context of a single country case-study. The 
Global Competitiveness Index (Schwab, 2010) may offer a possible avenue. Among the 
index sub-components, a measure of technological readiness is included. As discussed, 
the sources of economies of scale are mostly technological in nature. They may originate 
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in gains from more efficient division of labor (internal economies of scale), or can be 
derived from an expansion in the industry where the company operates, leading to 
increased leverage power with suppliers. Lastly, they may also be due to the use of more 
specialized inputs of production. The latter technological dimension is measured by the 
GCI Technological readiness sub-index, which approaches the capacity of an economy to 
adopt new technologies in order to improve the productivity of the national private 
sector19. The use of this measure implies assuming that if such technologies are available 
to the private sector, it would be more likely that the public sector is also introducing 
them in its production processes, thus increasing their productivity20. As a downside, the 
introduction of technological advances may allow cost reductions even in specialized 
production, thus making more efficient the tailoring of public good productions to local 
preferences.  
 
Heterogeneous Preferences and Fragmentation 
 
The second set of variables aims to test the hypothesis that heterogeneous preferences 
lead to greater jurisdictional fragmentation. This hypothesis is derived from Oates’s 
standard postulate that greater preference heterogeneity leads to smaller optimal group 
size for service delivery. Heterogeneous preferences are operationalized with measures of 
income, race and age dispersion. In terms of income dispersion, higher values of the Gini 
                                                            
19 The measure is a composite one, including values on aspects such as availability of new 
technologies, firm-level technology absorption, legal ICT framework, FDI and 
technology transfer, mobile and internet coverage, and personal computers per capita.  
20 Alternatively, to be fair, the public sector may suffer from Baumol’s disease, and 
witness rise in salaries in response to productivity increases in the private sector.  
112 
 
income inequality index should lead to preferences for territorially tailored social 
policies, and thus a higher the level of jurisdictional fragmentation where local 
governments can influence policy design and implementation.  
 
Equally, a measure of ethnic dispersion (taking into consideration race, language, and 
religious dimensions) is used to approximate heterogeneous preferences derived from 
varying ethnic compositions.21 Greater ethnic diversity is also expected to translate into a 
more fragmented government system that allows reflecting the preferences of the 
minorities. First, we used a recent contribution by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, 
Kurlat, & Wacziarg (2003), which provides recalculated measures of the Easterly & 
Levine (1997) data and disaggregated indexes of fractionalization, which are used in the 
estimations. In order to conduct a sensitivity analysis of results, checking the consistency 
of results with alternative measures, we also construct a Herfindahl ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization index on the basis of data on ethnic composition collected from 
Population Statistics (see Table 3.1 below). Both indexes were highly correlated and their 
alternative inclusion on the model estimations rendered no significant differences.   
 
We include an additional measure of heterogeneity of preferences as an index of age 
dispersion. The rationale behind it is that senior citizens are assumed to display well 
                                                            
21 Martinez-Vazquez et al. (1997) use the share of minorities over the total population in 
their analysis of the impact of race dispersion on school district consolidation.  
113 
 
differentiated sets of preferences (i.e. for a start, they may favor higher expenditures in 
health and lower expenditure in education as they do not have school-age children22).  
 
The fractionalization Herfindahl indexes (for both ethno linguistic and age 
fractionalization) used in this analysis have the form: 
 
ܨݎܽܿݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋ ௝݊ ൌ 1 െ  ෍ ݃௜௝
ଶ
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
 with 0 ≤ ݃௜௝≤ 1 
 
where gij is the share of group i in country j in unit terms. Thus, the larger the value of the 
index, the larger is the fractionalization of the country, and thus we assume the more 
likely a fragmented system of government will be in place to cater to those heterogeneous 
preferences. At the other extreme, where there is only one group, and thus the share of 
the group over the total population is 1 (or 100 percent), the fractionalization index would 
be zero. Thus, positive signs are expected in both coefficients for the age and ethnic-
fractionalization variables. 
 
Measuring Political Accountability 
Our variable of interest, political accountability, is operationalized in various forms. As 
discussed, the existence of elected government representatives at the sub-national levels 
                                                            
22 On the other hand, housing values are generally linked in the U.S. for instance to 
school quality. Or seniors may have grandchildren attending local schools, which would 
balance the set of preferences assumed by this indicator.  
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of government (as opposed to appointed by central government authorities) is a critical 
indicator of political accountability. Sub-national officials can be removed from office if 
policies are not reflective of the majority preferences, the very political link that is 
required for fiscal decentralization to succeed. However, the existence of sub-national 
elections is a necessary but not sufficient condition for accountability to be exercised. 
Several pseudo-democracies and even dictatorships around the world hold sub-national 
“elections”. In these countries, the range of candidates is severely limited to those of the 
party in power or political allies. No credible political alternatives are offered to citizens 
to choose from. To take account of the democratic status of countries around the world, 
we interact our dummy variable measuring the existence of sub-national elections with an 
index of legislative competitiveness from the Political Institutions Database (World 
Bank, 2006). 
 
In addition, we include in our model the World Bank’s Governance Index sub-component 
of “voice and accountability”. This indicator (with a minimum value of 0 and a maximum 
of 5) aims to measure the “extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in 
the selection of governments (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2008)”. The governance 
indicators collected by the World Bank include an additional indicator, “Government 
Effectiveness”, which aims to measure the capacity of the local bureaucracy to provide 
quality public services, and its independence from political pressures. Both measures 
cover aspects of our variable of interest (political accountability) and offer the 
opportunity of reducing the endogeneity of the model by using them as a proxy for the 
latter. Arguably, the “voice and accountability” indicator represents more closely the 
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capacity to elect and exercise control of the citizenry over their political class, the very 
essence of accountability.  
 
A third dimension of accountability that is explored is the authority of local 
representatives over tax collection and spending policies. It may be the case local 
authorities are elected but still budgets are “conditional’ in their use so that no spending 
discretion is allowed. Additionally, local authorities may not enjoy revenue raising 
capacity at the margin, which also limits their ability to respond to local needs. We 
measure this dimension in two ways, first, including a variable measuring the share of 
total expenditure conducted at the sub-national level, a traditional indicator of fiscal 
decentralization. Second, we include a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the sub-
national governments have authority over taxing, spending or legislating (World Bank, 
2006). Unfortunately, this variable is only available for a limited number of countries, 
reducing the number of observations importantly. 
 
Other variables that may importantly influence the level of jurisdictional fragmentation 
include the share of public expenditure out of GDP (for countries where government 
employment is the main source of family income in rural areas for instance). This 
variable presents however a clear problem of endogeneity, as more fragmented systems 
of government are more likely to show also a higher government share in GDP, and is 
therefore not used in our final model specification.  Alternatively, the existence of 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing the provision of social services as a right of the 
citizenry (with obvious fiscal and governmental implications) may greatly affect the level 
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of public sector expenditure. Unfortunately, the latter variable could not be obtained as 
our search for constitutional texts did not render recent versions in English that could be 
coded for a large number of countries.  
 
Additional Institutional Hypotheses 
 
A wide array of institutional variables may affect the level of fragmentation of a country, 
as we have previously discussed. The available political institutions data offers several 
alternatives to test institutional hypothesis in this context. Arguably, the impact of 
institutional variables is likely to extend beyond any single year and as such, a cross-
sectional analysis for a single year will not capture the full implications of maintaining or 
changing any critical aspect of the institutional fabric of a country. Our results in this area 
should therefore be taken with caution.  
 
First, we test the impact of having a presidential, parliamentary or assembly elected 
president on jurisdictional fragmentation. Second, we test whether the existence of a 
nationalistic party in power (arguably an advocate of unitary systems) leads to lower 
levels of fragmentation23.  As additional tests to the quality of democracy, we introduce a 
variable measuring whether there is a constitutional limit on the number of years an 
executive can serve before elections are called. Ideally, following Nelson (1990), we 
would have liked to include in our analysis whether provisions exist for minimum 
                                                            
23 As an example of the caveat introduced above, if a nationalistic party has just been 
elected, despite of its ideological leanings, it might not be able to affect the jurisdictional 
organization of the country unless it keeps in power for an extended period of time. From 
that point of view, the variable is likely not to be significant in a cross-sectional analysis.  
117 
 
population sizes for new jurisdiction creation. We were unable to collect this variable for 
a large number of countries where legislation is not easily accessible. 
 
Finally, anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that movements from autocratic to 
democratic systems of government release pent up pressure for jurisdictional 
fragmentation. Indonesia may be a good example where the advent of democracy 
unleashed a process of fragmentation (pemekaran) that translated into an increase in the 
number of sub-national level jurisdictions in search for democratic spaces of 
representation. The end of armed conflicts may also lead to such a process of new 
jurisdiction formation. We measure these dimensions with a single dummy variable with 
value one when either a significant transition to a more democratic system of government 
(measured by an increase in the Polity IV project index of 3 or more points) occurred in 
the country over the last 10 years.  
 
Geographic Control Variables 
 
Arguably, country size is related to government fragmentation. Difficulties in reaching 
isolated populations from the political center are a strong incentive to create sub-national 
levels of government that can deliver public services. We use country area (in square 
kilometers) to measure country size. Additionally, a measure of geographic accessibility 
is required, as countries with small land area may still be highly fragmented if they are of 
mountainous territory or display other natural features that difficult accessibility. Such 
lack of accessibility would lead to a preference for smaller governments closer to the 
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citizens. Absent a better measure of accessibility, we use the ratio of the highest to the 
lowest altitude in a country as a proxy for accessibility. Ideally, we would like to use 
many altitude points in every country to evaluate their dispersion, but such information 
could not be obtained.   
  
Alternative variables to consider in order to control for the way geographical 
characteristics may affect jurisdictional fragmentation could include the geographical 
position of a country, such as whether it is landlocked or coastal and thus we tested the 
impact of a dummy variable measuring this dimension. We also include a variable 
denoting the continent of location of the country and test for the impact of latitude, a 
variable that has proved highly significant in the analysis of economic growth patterns.   
 
3.3.2 Estimation Methodology and Data 
 
For our estimation strategy, we first approach the analysis of the determinants of the 
number of levels of government in a given country. Subsequently, we test the main 
hypothesis of model relative jurisdictional fragmentation across levels. The rationale for 
such an approach is the understanding that, although certain simultaneity in the process is 
obvious, presented with the opportunity to define the territorial structure of a country (for 
instance in the Constitution drafting processes), or at least to approach its reform, the 
logical sequential order of events is to first define the number of levels of government 
and, on that basis, determine the mechanisms for creation of new jurisdictions (or their 
merger) within each level. For example, the 1978 Spanish Constitution only defined the 
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different levels of government (regional, provincial, municipal). The Organic Law 
regulating this constitutional aspect established that in instances where regions are 
formed by just one province, the provincial level of government is sub-summed into the 
regional one as there is perfect overlap. The number of regions eventually created, and 
the number of municipalities existing currently in Spain is the result of an institutional 
process where most forces considered in this paper were at play.24  
 
As discussed in the previous section, the number of levels of government in a given 
country is a largely unattended dimension of jurisdictional fragmentation. By selecting 
the number of tiers of sub-national levels of government as the dependent variable, we 
will observe that while some countries have two tiers or even more, there are some other 
countries that have only one tier or none. Thus Tobit estimation appears to be an adequate 
estimation approach (Tobin 1950). Because the variable is censored at 0, in its standard 
mathematical expression, in terms of a latent variable y* (Baum, 2006): 
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where  ௜ܺᇱ is a row vector or explanatory variables, β  is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and μ ~ N(0,1) is the error term. 
                                                            
24 To date for instance, the Constitution in Spain has not been amended to include the 
names of the regions in its articles.    
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 In our sample, this variable either shows zeros for those countries with no sub-national 
levels of government or a positive integer between 1 and 4. Arguably, there are other 
alternatives to operationalize this aspect of jurisdictional fragmentation. For instance, we 
could have collapsed all positive values and turned this censored variable into a binary 
one, but at the cost of losing important information on the different number of tiers of 
sub-national governments. Alternatively, we could have counted all levels of government 
in the variable, including the central one, thus allowing for the use of an ordered probit 
model fit, another maximum likelihood estimation method. However, the cardinal nature 
of the variable suggests that ordered probit estimation is not the right approach25. Lastly, 
truncated data estimation methods were not appropriate since the data generation process 
did not present this characteristic. We could perhaps convert the variable into a truncated 
one by discarding all observations with a value of zero (Baum, 2006), but again at the 
cost of degrees of freedom and loss of information. 
 
Since this is the first exploration of the determinants of the number of sub-national levels 
of governments in a given country we maintain the same set of explanatory variables 
proposed in our theoretical framework, and therefore estimate the following equation: 
 
ܮప෡ ൌ ן଴൅  ߚଵܥ௜ ൅  ߚଶ ௜ܷ ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܲ ൅  ෍ ׎௝ ௝ܼ௜
ெ
௝ୀଵ
൅ ߤ௜ 
                                                            
25  We would expect that the number of sub-national tiers of government in a given 
country also depends on the number of tiers that already exist. It would become more 
difficult to add another tier if a relatively high number of sub-national levels of 
government already exists. Thus, the variable is non-ordinal in nature.  
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 where L is the number of levels of government, Ci represents economies of scale, Ui 
reflects the impact of heterogeneous preferences on over all welfare, Pi is our measure of 
political accountability, and Zji is a vector of other institutional and geographical 
variables. The marginal effects on the observed value L will be equal to the individual 
coefficients times the probability that the latent variable value is between a certain 
interval.  In practice, our interpretation of results will focus of the statistical significance 
of the coefficients and the direction (sign) of the relationships found. 
 
Once we have explored the determinants of government fragmentation into different tiers, 
we turn to the analysis of the more traditional aspects of jurisdictional fragmentation. 
Summary statistics for the data used in this analysis are provided in Table 3.1 below. The 
data have been collected from a wide variety of sources. As the database used for this 
empirical part of the analysis is a cross-section on nearly 200 countries, OLS estimation 
will be applied to the model specifications using the total number of jurisdictions, the 
average population per jurisdiction, and the average area per jurisdiction as alternative 
dependent variables.  
 
For simplicity, we will assume a linear functional form for this relationship and thus the 
equation to be estimated is: 
 
పܰ෡ ൌ ן଴൅ ߚଵܥ௜ ൅  ߚଶ ௜ܷ ൅  ߚଷ ௜ܲ ൅ ෍ ׎௝ ௝ܼ௜
ெ
௝ୀଵ
൅  ߤ௜ 
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 where N is the number of jurisdictions (or the average population or area per jurisdiction, 
depending on the specification), Ci represents economies of scale, Ui reflects the impact 
of heterogeneous preferences on over all welfare, Pi is our measure of political 
accountability, and Zji is a vector of other institutional and geographical variables. 
 
At the outset, and considering the multiple avenues through which the levels of 
fragmentation of a country can be determined, our model may leave out, due to lack of 
available data, critical explanatory variables and thus suffer from omitted variable bias 
that leads to higher standard errors. To explore this aspect we will conduct standardized 
Ramsey tests. Moreover, the size of our sample (effectively around 143 observations) 
limits the number of variables than can be included in the analysis. However, regional 
dummy variables are introduced to absorb common variation in regional fragmentation 
patterns. 
 
We had also initially assumed a linear form for our model, which may not accurately 
reflect the relationship between the variables. In order to test the linearity of the 
relationship hypothesized, we conducted graphical analysis, plotting the residuals against 
the suggested predictors in early model specifications and exploring any possible 
deviations from linearity. This analysis suggested the need to transform several of the 
variables into logarithmic form, and to opt for a quadratic form in the relationship 
between population and jurisdictional fragmentation. 
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Both the White and Breusch-Pagan tests showed a certain amount of heteroskedasticity as 
it was to be expected from the nature of our sample. Accordingly, robust standard errors 
were calculated to correct the heteroskedastic errors.  
Table 8. Summary Statistics of the Dataset 
Variable 
Name Max Min Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Obs. Description Source Year 
Population 1,330,044,605 5,079 30,724,686 123,328,416 218 Total Country Population International Database, US Census Bureau 2008 
Domestic 
Market 
Size 
6.93 1.3 3.78 1.18 132 Sum of GDP plus imports, minus exports, normalized on a 1-7 scale World Economic Forum 2008 
Techno 
Readiness 6.15 2.19 3.80 1.09 132 
Composite Index of Technological 
Capacity World Economic Forum  2008 
Age014 50.00 13.40 28.89 10.45 218 Percentage of Population under 15 years of age 
International Database, US 
Census Bureau 2008 
Age1564 79.90 47.80 63.51 6.75 218 Percentage of Population between 15 and 64 years of age 
International Database, US 
Census Bureau 2008 
Age65+ 22.80 0.90 7.60 5.11 218 Percentage of Population over 64 years of age 
International Database, US 
Census Bureau 2008 
AHV 0.67 0.46 0.51 0.03 218 Age Herfindahl Country Value 
AleELF 0.93 0 0.44 0.26 187 Ethno linguistic Fractionalization Herfindahl Index Alesina et al (2003) 
AleLin 0.92 0.00 0.39 0.28 192 Language Fractionalization Index Alesina et al (2003) 
AleRel 0.86 0.00 0.44 0.23 202 Religion Fractionalization Index Alesina et al (2003) 
Country 
Area 16,995,800 2.00 597,974 1,774,385 218 Total Country Area in square kms 
International Database, US Census 
Bureau 
Gini 74.61 24.00 40.88 9.91 151 Income/Expenditure Inequality U.N. Wider Database Several Years 
ConIneq 1.00 0 151 Dummy variable with value 1 for Consumption inequality data 
GDPpc 85,382 298 13,259 15,704 182 Purchasing Power Parity GDP Data United Nations HDR 2007 
VAI 4.07 0.19 2.49 1.00 205 Voice and Accountability Index World Bank 2007 
GEI 4.91 0.15 2.48 1.00 209 Government Effectiveness Index World Bank 2007 
SubDem 
Status 2 0 1.1 0.882 190 
Interaction term; Sub-national 
Elections*Democratic Status 
(0=Dictatorship, 1=Pseudo 
Democracy, 2=Electoral 
Democracy) 
Own Calculations 2009 
SubDem 
Status2 0 7 5.08 2.93 171 
Interaction Term: Sub-National 
Elections *Index of Legislative 
Competitiveness (0=No legislature – 
7=Multiple parties got seats in 
Parliament) 
World Bank and Own 
Calculations 2006 
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Table 8. Summary Statistics of the Dataset (Continued) 
Finite 
Term 1 0 0.894 0.308 170 
Existence of a Finite Term for the 
Legislature World Bank 2006 
Change 
Polity4 1 0 0.21 0.41 171 
Dummy variable with Value 1 if 
increase in the Democratic Polity IV 
project index of 3 or more points 
occurred in the country over the last 
10 years. 
Polity IV 2008 
Level2 118 2 17 18 211 Number of Jurisdictions in Level # Several Several Years 
Level3 14,000 5 442 1,352 164 Number of Jurisdictions in Level # Several Several Years 
Level4 240,073 - 7,237 31,144 62 Number of Jurisdictions in Level # Several Several Years 
Level5 42,008 432 14,822 17,954 10 Number of Jurisdictions in Level # Several Several Years 
Pop/Juris 577,674 542.9 56,736 86,057 212 Average Population per jurisdiction Own Calculations Several Years 
Area/Juris 76,501 0.18 1,981 6,261 212 Average Area per Jurisdiction Own Calculations Several Years 
Sublevels 4 0 1.944 .772 Several 196 Number of Sub-national Levels of Government 
Several 
Years 
3.4 Results 
 
We now turn to the analysis of the results from the estimation of the first model of 
jurisdictional fragmentation using the number of sub-national levels of government of a 
given country as the dependent variable. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation we argued that 
the creation of a new level of government would be justified if overall welfare is 
improved (considering losses from economies of scale, gains from tailoring preferences 
to citizens, and preferences for political accountability) by assigning the provision of 
public goods and services from the central (or local) level of government to a new sub-
national level.  
 
The hypothesized determinants of the number of sub-national levels of 
government coincide therefore with those used in the above analysis of jurisdictional 
fragmentation. As we discussed, we use maximum likelihood estimation (i.e. a tobit 
regression model) to conduct this analysis. The results of the tobit regression model are 
shown in Table 3.2 below.  
 
From our results, it would seem that the vertical structure of government might be 
solely related to “size” variables and not to other institutional or preference-related 
aspects. As naturally expected, we find a strong positive relationship between population 
and fragmentation, defined as the number of sub-national tiers of government. Equally, a 
large country area seems to increase the probability of having more sub-national levels of 
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government. Both results are robust to the different model specifications, even after 
regional dummy variables are included.  
 
Of the set of variables measuring heterogeneity of preferences, it would not seem 
that any of them offers significant insights as to their impact on this aspect of 
fragmentation. We could not find either any significant relationship between our set of 
institutional variables and the number of levels of sub-national government. This is 
somewhat surprising since we had expected that for example more ethnic 
fractionalization would have led to a higher probability of having regional level 
governments representing those differences. It would seem that, at least in our sample, 
geographical effects, captured partly by the regional dummies, are more important 
determinants of this aspect of jurisdictional fragmentation.    
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Table 9. Results from the Tobit Model 
 Dep. Variable: Number of Sub-national Levels of Government 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Population .091** (.041) 
.086** 
(.042) 
.092** 
(.042) 
Area .064** (.031) 
.060* 
(.031)    
.055* 
(.029) 
AleELF -.361 (.224) 
-.364 
(.228) 
-.281 
(.229) 
Gini -.004 (.005) 
-.004 
(.005) 
.006 
(.006) 
ConIneq   .144 (.139)   
.141 
(.145) 
.196 
(.165) 
GDPpc -.058 (.058) 
-.048 
(.063) 
-.049 
(.062) 
AHV -.024 (1.785) 
.188 
(1.894) 
.022 
(1.817) 
Sub National 
Elections*Dem Status 2  
.006 
(.021) 
.001 
(.022) 
VAI  -.037 (.057) 
-.084 
(.058) 
Oceania   -.089 (.183) 
South America   -.383* (.205) 
Central America   -.535*** (.157) 
North America   -.684*** (.217) 
Asia   -.386** (.174) 
Africa   -.379 (.213) 
Constant .673 (1.221) 
.682 
(1.269) 
.733 
(1.192) 
Number of Observations 144 141 141 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1358 0.1259 0.1684 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -114.65 -113.25 -107.75 
Sigma .536 (.034) 
.540 
(.033) 
.519 
(.034) 
Probability > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: MLE estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Population, GDPpc 
and Area in logarithmic form.  Europe is the reference group for the regional dummy 
variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively 
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Estimation results for the next three measures of jurisdictional fragmentation are 
presented in Table 3.3 below. As discussed, we use three measures of jurisdictional 
fragmentation: total number of jurisdictions, population average and area size average per 
jurisdiction. For each of these variables, we estimate three model specifications. In the 
first one (Models 1, 4 and 7 respectively), we test the standard economic hypotheses of 
fragmentation, that is, the impact of economies of scale and of heterogeneity of 
preferences in the level of jurisdictional fragmentation. 
 
Ramsey tests were run on each of the regressions, searching for possible omitted 
variable bias, with negative results.26 Initial plotting of the regressions residuals against 
the main variables of interest showed departures from the linearity assumption, and thus 
transformation of certain independent variables were required. In particular, we 
hypothesized a quadratic relationship between fragmentation and population levels; we 
also transformed area and per capita GDP into a logarithmic form, and also took the logs 
of our dependent variables. Correlation was found among some variables (especially 
between population and area as it was to be expected), leading to a certain amount of 
multicollinearity. Most of our coefficients are however individually and jointly 
significant, and very robust to different model specifications, both in terms of their size 
and signs, so this aspect did not seem to be relevant.    
 
We applied the Breusch-Pagan test to our initial model specification, with the 
results suggesting a certain amount of heteroscedasticity existed, confirmed by the 
                                                            
26 We used both linktest and ovtest Stata commands, with both tests supporting the 
hypothesis of no omitted variables in the model.  
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plotting of residuals against some of the quasi-ordinal variables in the sample (such as 
Sub-national Democratic status). As a result, our final estimations calculated and reported 
robust standard errors.     
 
Our second model specification includes proxy variables attempting to measure 
demand for political accountability. From our theoretical framework, we derived the 
result that, all things equal, demand for political accountability should translate into a 
smaller optimal jurisdictional size, and thus lead to higher fragmentation. Results of this 
specification can be seen in Models 2, 5 and 8. Finally, our third model specification (for 
which results are presented in Model 3, 6 and 9 below) included a series of geographical 
and institutional control variables meant to test the robustness of the findings.    
 
Regrettably, the variable approximating potential for economies of scale 
(technological readiness) proved insignificant and did not add to the overall explanatory 
power of the model. Individual significance tests confirmed this finding and the variable 
was discarded from the final model specification. This result left us without a proxy 
variable for economies of scale, a fact already common to other studies on the 
determinants of fragmentation. As we discussed, the difficulties in approximating this 
dimension seem insurmountable at this time. Ideally, as in Chapter 2, we would like to 
input into the analysis the “true value” of economies of scale for local services (that is, 
the true value of the cost elasticity of production) in a given country derived from a meta-
analysis such as the one conducted in the previous chapter. That is not an available option 
right now. The proxies considered (population, technological readiness, market size) all 
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present serious identification issues or are simply not significant in the empirical analysis. 
The absence of this variable would mean that the variation in the level of jurisdictional 
fragmentation across countries due to the different potential for economies of scale is left 
in the error term, reducing the explanatory power of the model. However, in terms of the 
remaining set of hypotheses, we still draw important conclusions, outlined below.  
 
 First, the results show that, as expected, population and area are naturally and 
positively correlated with the level of jurisdictional fragmentation of a country. 
Population seems to be non-linearly related to jurisdictional fragmentation. Higher 
population leads to increasing levels of fragmentation, but at a decreasing rate. This 
relationship holds both for absolute measures of fragmentation (total number of 
jurisdictions) or relative ones (ratio of area to number of jurisdictions). The maximum 
level of fragmentation is reached at a population level of around 1 billion people, a level 
that only India and China have reached. An alternative model specification was tested 
whereby population was included as explanatory variable in the model in a logarithmic 
(and not quadratic) form. The estimation of this specification showed that a 1 percent 
increase in population led to a 0.68 percent increase in the total number of jurisdictions, a 
less than proportional increase. The relationship between area and fragmentation is 
equally significant. A 1 percent increase in country area leads to a .3 percent increase in 
the total number of jurisdictions in the full model specification.  
 
The set of variables measuring heterogeneity of preferences also offers 
statistically significant and sizable results. Our measure of ethno-linguistic fragmentation 
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suggests, perhaps counter-intuitively, that greater dispersion on ethnic and linguistic 
groups leads to lower jurisdictional fragmentation, both in terms of smaller number of 
jurisdictions and higher average area. The result may a priori seem surprising, but it is 
very robust across model specifications, and even when an alternative measure of ethno-
linguistic fragmentation is used. It is reasonable to assume that ethno-linguistic 
differences would lead to heterogeneous preferences, but the data would seem to show 
that the end result may be a lower level of jurisdictional fragmentation, both in terms of 
the total number of jurisdictions and larger average size. A possible explanation for this 
result is that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is more prevalent in poorer, low-growth 
countries with lower quality of government (Alberto Alesina et al., 2003). Already 
(Aghion, Alesina, & Trebbi, 2002) find that ethnic fractionalization is inversely related to 
quality of democracy27. It follows that countries with lower quality of government (less 
democratic societies) and high ethno-linguistic fractionalization are less likely to create 
spaces for democratic representation with additional levels of government or new 
jurisdictions. This is an aspect for which we already control for in our model however28, 
so we are left without a better explanation for the consistency of this relationship. 
 
Our second variable approximating heterogeneous preferences, the age dispersion 
index, displays the hypothesized sign, but it is not robust across specifications. It would 
seem that greater age dispersion leads to a smaller average jurisdictional size, but we find 
                                                            
27 A result robust in our sample even when we control for country latitude. 
28 In fact we find a negative correlation between the Alesina et al. measure of ethnic 
fractionalization and the variables approximating quality of democracy in our sample. 
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no statistically significant evidence of the variable affecting the total number of 
jurisdictions or average population size.  
  
Larger per capita GDP also leads to lower levels of fragmentation in our sample. 
To the extent that overall increases in per capita income tend to homogenize preferences 
for public good provision, this result may be a reasonable one to expect. Although 
significant, the relationship between jurisdictional fragmentation and inequality shows 
that increases in inequality may lead to lower jurisdictional fragmentation overall, a result 
that goes against what we expected. The results are not robust however to the insertion of 
regional dummies in the model.  
 
 Our variables approximating preferences for political accountability are 
significant and display the hypothesized sign. The interaction term formed by the 
existence of sub-national elections and a measure of democratic status or legislative 
competitiveness proved to be significant and robust to different model specifications. The 
sign of the coefficient is positive, indicating that increased demand for political 
accountability leads to higher jurisdictional fragmentation, both in terms of a greater 
number of jurisdictions or smaller average area per jurisdictions. It could be argued that 
this relationship may be endogenous, and that in more jurisdictionally fragmented 
countries citizens are more participative and more likely to demand enhanced political 
accountability. That may not be the case however. As we discussed, (Lowery & Lyons, 
1989) showed no evidence of better information levels of citizens at lower levels of 
government. In any case it would seem that the construction of the interaction term would 
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dispel doubts as to the possible endogeneity between these two variables. The use of an 
independent assessment of democratic quality and of an index of legislative 
competitiveness also independent from the territorial organization of the country should 
diminish the possible problem of double causation. The World Bank Voice and 
Accountability Index, a “measure of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in 
the selection of governments”, displayed identical sign as the earlier measure of 
democratic quality but it was only statistically significant when average area per 
jurisdiction was selected as the dependent variable.   
    
We explored several other avenues through which institutional aspects related to 
demand for political accountability could have impacted the level of jurisdictional 
fragmentation. First, we included the number of sub-national levels of government as an 
explanatory variable. A larger number of jurisdictions is likely to be found in countries 
with more levels of government. The reason behind is that intermediate levels of 
government are able to deliver services to local or municipal governments unable to do so 
due to their small size. Lack of resort to such intermediate levels of government (i.e., 
county governments in the U.S., regional districts in British Columbia, or provincial 
governments in Spain) would introduce incentives to local mergers, and thus reduce 
jurisdictional fragmentation. This relationship proved to be highly significant. As 
hypothesized, more levels of government led to an increase in the overall number of 
jurisdictions. The results, however, did not suggest that a similarly strong statistical 
relationship existed between levels of government and the average jurisdictional size.  
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Secondly, we tested a set of several institutional aspects that may have reasonably 
affected the level of fragmentation and are proxies for democratic quality. These 
included; 1) the number of years of the executive in office (signal of quasi-democratic 
systems when its value exceeds 8); 2) the constitutional existence of a finite term in 
office before new elections are called; 3) whether a nationalist party is in power (more 
likely to advocate for a less decentralized state) and 4) the parliamentary system of the 
country. Of this set of variables, only the existence of a finite term in office seemed to 
significantly affect the total number of jurisdictions, but not their average size. It must be 
again mentioned that some of the explanatory variables we use may exert their influence 
over the process of creation or merger of jurisdictions over time. This influence may take 
more time than one year in which we are observing the data and therefore our cross-
sectional analysis is limited in this respect.  
 
Thirdly, we introduced in the analysis available indicators measuring the size of 
the public sector in the GDP, the share of sub-national expenditure over the national total, 
and a variable measuring whether fiscal authority existed over expenditure or tax policies 
at the local level (for which only 29 observations were available). We could not find 
significant relationships between these variables and the level of jurisdictional 
fragmentation and were eliminated from final model specifications. Fourthly, the variable 
approximating built up demands for jurisdictional fragmentation that may have been 
released via recent advances to the democratic quality of system of government proved to 
be non-significant.   
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Finally, in order to at least partly to account for the country fixed effects from our 
sample, we introduced regional dummy variables. Using Europe as the group of reference 
(arguably the most fragmented region together with North America), the dummy 
variables showed significant and lower levels of fragmentation. Their inclusion did not 
affect the significance of our main variables for the different hypothesis and added 
importantly to the overall explanatory value of the model.  
Table 10. Results from the OLS Estimation 
 Dep. Variable: Log of Total Number of Jurisdictions 
Dep. Variable: Log of Area to 
Jurisdictions Ratio 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Population 
(Milllions) 
.020*** 
(.003) 
.021***   
(.003) 
.019***   
(.003) 
-.006** 
(.003) 
-.006**   
(.003) 
-.006*    
(.003) 
Population 
Squared 
-.1x10-4***   
(0.02x10-4) 
-.1x10-4*** 
(0.02x10-4) 
-.1x10-4*** 
(0.02x10-4) 
0.04x10-4* 
(0.02x10-4) 
0.04x10-4* 
(0.02x10-4) 
0.04x10-4* 
(0.02x10-4) 
Area .384*** (.061) 
.266***   
(.060) 
.292***   
(.057)    
AleELF -1.899*** (.583) 
-1.380**   
(.539) 
- 1.392**   
(.565) 
2.851*** 
( .711) 
2.553***   
(.692) 
2.251***   
(.745) 
Gini -.024** (.011) 
-.024***   
(.009) 
-.006 
(.011) 
.033** 
(.015) 
.0362**   
(.014) 
.007 
(.016) 
ConIneq -.235 (.279) 
-.407 
(.250) 
-.211 
(.273) 
.166 
(.345) 
.141    
(.323) 
-.056    
(.348) 
GDPpc -.140 (.146) 
-.249**  
(.128) 
-.324***   
(.138) 
.181 
(.192) 
.401**   
(.186) 
. .413*   
(.212) 
AHV -4.590 (4.513) 
-6.348 
(4.095) 
-5.529 
(4.317) 
-11.641* 
(6.507) 
-14.552**   
(7.041) 
-11.792   
(7.119) 
Sub National 
Elections*Dem 
Status 2 
 .145***   (.035) 
.137***   
(.038)  
-.132**   
(.055) 
-.123**   
(.059) 
VAI  .118    (.121) 
.099 
(.127)    
-.333**   
(.157) 
-.333*   
(.170) 
Sub Levels  .907***   (.199) 
.806***   
(.201)  
-.238    
(.198) 
-.235   
(.203) 
Oceania   -1.531***   (.387)   
2.614***   
(.822) 
South America   -.875**   (.431)   
1.892*** 
(.521) 
Central America   -.805***   (.369)   
.305 
(.565) 
North America   .206 (.713)   
.856 
(.728) 
Asia   -.568 (.388)   
.701 
(.572) 
Africa   -.935**   (.442)     
1.229**   
(.624) 
Constant 1.553 (2.467) 
6.131**   
(2.762) 
6.208** 
(2.841) 
7.949** 
(3.612) 
-4.936 
(4.137) 
-3.118 
(4.236) 
Number of 
Observations 144 141 141 144 141 141 
R-squared 0.58 0.67 0.71 0.26 0.31 0.39 
Probability > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. GDPpc and Area in logarithmic 
form.  
Europe is the reference group for the regional dummy variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively 
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Table 10. Results from the OLS Estimation (Cont.) 
 Dep. Variable: Log of Population to Jurisdictions Ratio 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Area -.015 (.055) 
.017 
(.054) 
.026 
(.059) 
AleELF 1.178 (.547) 
.826 
(.529) 
.884 
(.562) 
Gini .013 (.011) 
.017 
(.012)   
.003 
(.015) 
ConIneq .157 (.275) 
.241 
(.247) 
.026 
(.264) 
GDPpc -.062 (.139) 
.071 
(.137) 
.187 
(.146) 
AHV 2.635 (4.474) 
3.932 
(4.177) 
4.362 
(4.281) 
Sub National 
Elections*Dem Status 2  
-.143*** 
(.037) 
-.128*** 
(.041) 
VAI  -.116 (.133) 
-.072 
(.131) 
Sub Levels  -.427** (.195) 
-.357* 
(.204) 
Oceania   .789** (.382) 
South America   .677 (.492) 
Central America   .724* (.396) 
North America   -.598 (.751) 
Asia   .794* (.417) 
Africa   .948* (.498)   
Constant 8.569*** (3.067) 
8.362*** 
(2.958) 
6.724** 
(2.941) 
Number of Observations 144 141 141 
R-squared 0.13 0.23 0.28 
Probability > F 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. GDPpc and Area in logarithmic 
form.  
Europe is the reference group for the regional dummy variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively 
3.5 Conclusions  
 
In this chapter, we have tested the traditional hypotheses of the literature on 
optimal jurisdictional size (economies of scale and heterogeneous preferences), but also 
the implications of preferences for political accountability on the international levels of 
jurisdictional fragmentation observed around the world.  
 
We have, for the first time to our knowledge, analyzed a largely unexplored 
dimension of jurisdictional fragmentation, the determinants of the number of levels of 
government, together with more traditional measures of fragmentation used in the 
literature. Overall, the vertical structure of government, at least in our sample, might be 
mostly related to “size” variables and not to other institutional or preference-related 
aspects. Both population and area size are positively correlated to the number of 
government tiers of a country. This result is common to all model specifications and 
dependent variables used as measures of fragmentation.  
 
Our main result, in line with the conclusions of our theoretical model, is that 
preferences for political accountability would lead to smaller jurisdictional size and a 
larger number of governments. These results are robust across different model 
estimations. They also lend strong support to our contention that accountability needs to 
be added to the list of critical dimensions in the theory of optimal jurisdictional size, even 
though this aspect has not yet been fully incorporated into the standard economic theory. 
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Additionally, we find support to the hypothesis that the higher the number of 
government tiers, the more likely it is that jurisdictional fragmentation will be high. 
Small local governments have less of an incentive to consolidate into larger jurisdictions 
if the immediately higher government tier provides, assuming subsidiary responsibility, 
the services the former are unable to due to their limited capacity.  
 
Although there is a strong theoretical case to expect that more heterogeneous 
preferences should lead, all other things equal, to more jurisdictional fragmentation, the 
set of variables used to approximate this aspect display mixed results. In some cases, 
although the variable proposed may be certainly reflective of heterogeneous preferences, 
other interfering variables may affect the causality of the relationship sought. High ethno-
linguistic fragmentation, for instance, seem to be related to lower levels of fragmentation 
due to political economy issues related to the quality of democracy in countries that show 
high ethno-linguistic fractionalization. As we have argued, ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization is more prevalent in poorer, low-growth countries with lower quality of 
government. Thus, less democratic societies with high ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
are less likely to create spaces for democratic representation with additional levels of 
government or new jurisdictions.  
 
Our analysis underlines also the need to continue to explore new avenues for the 
measurement of economies of scale on local service delivery, a critical aspect that the 
empirical literature, including our contribution, has not been able to address adequately.  
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CHAPTER 4 
A ROADMAP FOR THE ANALYSIS OF JURISDICTIONAL FORMATION  
AND REFORM 
 
“…it is still too early to conclude that an optimum size has been established for 
metropolitan and local governments.” Breton (1965) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Is a country’s vertical structure of government efficient? Should it reduce the number of 
small jurisdictions via consolidation and jurisdictional merger? Under what 
circumstances should the country consider the creation of a new government tier? These 
and similar questions are posed regularly in countries around the world, regardless of 
their development level, cultural ties, religious leanings or cultural and institutional 
fabric. The answers to such questions are not straightforward. As in many other aspects 
of public policy, we have to conclude that there is no single ideal level of jurisdictional 
fragmentation. Delving in the empirical and applied policy literature in this area, we may 
however be able to suggest a process to develop a solid technical base to assist policy 
formulation. Thus, in this final chapter, we aim to provide an analytical framework that 
guides the formulation of jurisdictional reform by synthesizing the empirical results of 
this dissertation and summarizing the lessons learnt from the international experience. 
 
142 
 
The international experience shows that countries around the world have defined a vast 
number of criteria, both qualitative and quantitative, for regulating the formation of new 
jurisdictions (or the merge of existing ones). The former offer enhanced flexibility (and 
are perhaps more vulnerable to political manipulation) and have therefore been favored 
commonly over more transparent quantitative measures (Handry & Martinez-Vazquez, 
2008). The review of these criteria offers a first assessment of how theoretical 
considerations related to the determination of optimal jurisdictional size have been 
translated into policy. It also represents a benchmark to analyze to what extent current 
levels of jurisdictional fragmentation fit the ideal “efficient” patterns.  
 
Among the most widely used criteria for regulating new jurisdiction formation, most 
countries use different forms of population criteria. These vary significantly even within 
a given geographic region (for example, from the 50,000 people requirement in Ecuador 
to the 5,000 requirement of Paraguay in Latin America) and may be determined either by 
the national government (for regional and municipal tiers) or, in federal or quasi-federal 
countries, by regional levels of government (for municipal or local levels, such as in 
Argentina, Spain, Australia, etc.). In addition, some countries have required that the 
formation of a new jurisdiction be subjected to minimum land area criteria. For instance, 
in Colombia, a new municipality must not represent more than one third of the territory 
of the municipality from which it emerges. In addition, it is normally required that the 
territory of the new jurisdiction has territorial continuity.  
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The review process for new jurisdiction formation also includes generally the analysis of 
the socio-economic conditions of the localities and the population support for the request, 
thus evaluating to a certain extent the existence of heterogeneous preferences. In Latvia 
for instance, the Council for Administrative Territorial Reform conducts a full 
investigation for new jurisdiction formation that includes these issues. Additionally, 
higher tiers of government tend to evaluate the fiscal and administrative feasibility of the 
future jurisdictions. In Mexico, the law requires that the evaluation of requests for new 
jurisdiction formation includes a feasibility analysis that demonstrates the new 
jurisdictions will have sufficient fiscal capacity to run their administrations. 
 
At the origin of demands for new jurisdiction formation we also find a preference for 
political accountability or accessibility to local government representatives. Among the 
criteria used to evaluate the representatives’ capacity to attend to their constituencies 
when considering new jurisdictions we find population density, average distance to the 
new jurisdiction capital, land area, or even the state of local communications 
infrastructure as a proxy for travel time to the capital center (Mexico). 
 
In a recent report on the process of jurisdictional fragmentation observed in Indonesia, 
Handry & Martinez-Vazquez (2008) distil the main criteria that should lead the 
consideration of new jurisdiction formation: 1) the production/cost efficiency criterion; 2) 
the representation/political responsiveness/accountability criterion; 3) the financial/fiscal 
capacity criterion; and 4) the administrative capacity criterion. In this chapter we 
combine those criteria with the results of the empirical analysis conducted in chapters 3 
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and 4 of this dissertation to provide an analytical framework for the evaluation and 
implementation of jurisdictional reforms. As such, we do not summarize here the 
conclusions already contained in the empirical analysis, but apply them, together with the 
lessons learnt from other contributions, to the definition of a set of lessons or principles 
that may assist the formulation of jurisdictional consolidation/fragmentation policies 
around the world.  
 
4.2 A set of guiding principles for jurisdictional reform 
 
1. Clarify the objectives of the jurisdictional reform.  
 
Although it may appear to be a straightforward proposition, any jurisdictional reform 
must depart from the definition of clear policy objectives. This is especially important in 
light of the implicit trade-offs between some of the policy goals generally considered for 
this type of reform. In the past, jurisdictional reforms have been pursued, among other 
reasons, to: 1) achieve savings in the average cost of local public service production; 2) 
improve the allocative efficiency of government by better matching local preferences 
with jurisdictional borders; 3) create new democratic spaces of representation; and 4) 
assist economic competition in a globalized world (especially in the case of large 
metropolitan centers).  
 
For example, when jurisdictional reforms are initiated in the context of fiscal crisis, the 
overarching objective is likely to be the reduction of average costs of service provision. 
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This, if it leads to consolidation in order to achieve economies of scale, may be at odds 
with alternative objectives such as ensuring political accountability or attending to 
heterogeneous preferences. Thus a clear list with the prioritization of objectives can assist 
better policy formulation.  
 
However, the traditional policy tradeoffs encountered when approaching jurisdictional 
reform may not be insurmountable. In theory, it may be viable to ensure a greater level of 
achievement of these independent policy objectives if the policy alternatives considered 
are not solely limited to jurisdictional consolidation or fragmentation. Recent 
international experiences show that there is an array of institutional mechanisms for local 
service delivery that can achieve efficiency gains in the production of public services 
without compromising political accountability or the tailoring of public services to local 
preferences. The latter will be further discussed below. 
 
2. Avoid dogmatic and uniform approaches: One size does not fit all.  
 
Jurisdictional reform must start from the assumption that the expected efficiency gains 
from consolidation or further fragmentation may not be shared across the territory by all 
existing jurisdictions. The analysis of the empirical literature on economies of scale in 
public service delivery shows that the population level at which such savings in the 
average cost of production is exhausted varies widely by service and by sample of 
jurisdictions.  
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The pioneering work of Hirsch (1959) unveiled that economies of scale in fire services 
were exhausted after a 100,000 population level was reached. In Bodkin & Conklin 
(1971) the reduction in the average production costs of police and fire services was 
limited to population sizes between 5,000 and 10,000 citizens, whereas for water supply 
and public works it extended to population sizes of around 150,000 people. For solid 
waste collection, McDavid (2000) determines full economies of scale are reached in 
localities with up to 5,000 inhabitants in Canada, while Stevens (1978) optimal 
population size for refuse collection in his USA sample is reached at 20,000 people. 
Finally, in Spain, Bel (2005) also finds that population sizes of around 20,000 exhaust the 
potential economies of scale in waste collection.  
 
Such population limits are even more restrictive in the area of education. As discussed 
above, Duncombe et al. (1995) show that only the consolidation of districts with less than 
500 students in the state of New York offers potential for the reduction in average costs. 
In a similar study, Edelman & Knudsen (1990) in Iowa conclude that economies of scale 
are concentrated in student populations between 800 and 900 students. Lastly, in Maine, 
the optimal student population size for a school district is estimated by Deller & Rudnicki 
(1992) in around 2000 students.  
 
Thus optimal jurisdictional sizes for service delivery may vary by service, and even 
within the same service, due to other factors such as geography, may not be identical 
across a given national territory. Furthermore, as production and delivery technology 
change, it may affect the expected potential for economies of scale dramatically. In such 
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a fluid environment, flexible approaches that allow multiple institutional set ups for 
service delivery are required to respond to the different characteristics of a country’s 
jurisdictions.  
 
3. Start by clarifying sub-national functional assignments.  
 
In light of the different potential for economies of scale associated with the traditional 
local public services, a clear understanding of the sub-national expenditure assignments is 
required in order to estimate the net impact of jurisdictional reform on the average cost of 
service production. Consolidation for instance would not offer great efficiency gains if 
the set of services being delivered by local governments are such (and will remain to be 
such) that the optimal jurisdictional sizes for their production are small.  
 
Expenditure assignments may not even be homogeneous across a given country’s 
government tiers. Asymmetric assignments, whereby increased expenditure authority is 
allocated for a larger number of services to jurisdictions with proven managerial capacity 
are common around the world. This adds yet another caveat to the expected gains to be 
obtained from consolidation for instance, since the consolidation policy could be 
promising (in terms of reductions in average production costs) for just a given sub-set of 
sub-national governments and not others of the same tier.  
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4. Examine each case individually under transparent guidelines and identify the 
potential for economies of scale.  
 
In light of the significant number of caveats that may affect the achievement of the 
objectives defined for jurisdictional reform (either consolidation or fragmentation), 
individual attention to each case is important to establish whether such objectives are 
likely to be achieved. Clear national (or sub-national, if regions for instance are tasked 
with deciding on this issue) guidelines and criteria, both quantitative and qualitative, 
should be made available to jurisdictions considering altering their territorial limits. 
 
In particular, the evaluation process must aim to offer substantive information and 
analysis to the citizenry as to what can be expected from the consolidation (or division) 
process. For example, details of the expected savings (or improvements in the quality) of 
the provision of services could help curb opposition to consolidation. Over the last couple 
of decades, the methodological analysis of economies of scale has improved 
considerably. From the modeling of production costs using translog functions to the use 
of data envelopment analysis (DEA) to explore relative productive efficiency, advances 
in the analysis of economies of scale allow estimating their potential within reasonable 
margins. These and other methodologies can provide extremely useful information as to 
whether the desired gains in cost savings from jurisdictional reform are truly available 
and should become “due diligence” analytical requirements.  
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5. Preferences for political accountability lead to smaller jurisdictional sizes and 
reforms must adequately incorporate this aspect.  
 
Even in situations where relatively homogeneous preferences exist, together with certain 
potential for economies of scale, consolidation may be hindered by citizen’s preferences 
to remain close to their local representatives. The inertia of existing institutional 
arrangements and the identity associated with them cannot be underestimated when 
considering jurisdictional reforms.  
 
Our empirical analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation patterns across countries has 
controlled for the best available indicators of heterogeneous preferences and still finds 
that preferences for political accountability affect very importantly the results. Given the 
presence of such preferences, one expects to find average jurisdictional sizes below what 
the mere analysis of economies of scale and heterogeneous preferences would indicate. 
 
Thus, citizen’s resistance to consolidation in a given jurisdiction may also be the exercise 
of a preference for proximity to their local representatives, an important variable to be 
added to the economic analysis of optimal jurisdictional size. Acknowledging that 
preferences across jurisdictions may often be quite homogeneous, and that economies of 
scale may exist to a certain scale if consolidation ensued, citizens may still be willing to 
pay a higher price for services (in the form of taxes) for the geographical proximity to 
their representatives. In such situations, alternative avenues for service delivery that 
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allow reaching economies of scale while respecting current fragmentation levels will be 
required. 
  
6. Existing institutions and regulations can jeopardize reaching efficiency gains in 
the short to medium term.  
 
The expected administrative savings from jurisdictional consolidation may be 
compromised from the start. Regulations in public sector employment (or the power of 
public sector unions) for instance may lead to upward equalization of local public salaries 
in the event of consolidation, increasing administrative costs. Also, restrictions to 
retrenchment in public sector employment may limit short term efficiency gains in this 
area. 
 
The relative importance of these aspects will vary importantly from one country to 
another depending on the regulatory framework for public sector employment. If, for 
instance, a large percentage of employees in sub-national administrations are under fixed 
term contracts, it may be easier to adapt to the expectedly lower human resources 
requirements of a consolidated administration.  In the long run, all factors of production 
could be altered, but such analysis must be incorporated in the estimation of the cost 
savings (increases) expected from consolidation (fragmentation).  
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7. Intermediate levels of government may pose a limit to local consolidation.  
 
The existence of intermediate tiers of government with subsidiary responsibility over the 
delivery of services that local governments cannot provide due to their limited capacity 
may take away incentives to jurisdictional mergers. 
 
The scenario is relatively common in several countries around the world: small municipal 
governments unable to meet their expenditure assignments that relinquish the provision 
of certain services to the immediately higher tier. From a political economy perspective, 
these situation contributes to justify the role of the intermediate levels of government, 
while diminishes the incentives for municipal mergers. Our empirical analysis has shown 
this variable to be a highly significant determinant of current levels of fragmentation, thus 
lending support to a generalization of this result for a large sample of countries. On the 
other hand, the existence of intermediate levels of government may be perfectly justified 
because of the size of the country and the externalities across local jurisdictions in the 
provision of certain public services. 
 
8. Multi-layered institutional frameworks may allow for efficiency gains without 
loss of political representation.  
 
The international experience shows that, around the world, new institutional set ups for 
public service delivery may be allowing jurisdictions to reach economies of scale without 
the need for changes to jurisdictional sizes. The experience of special districts, inter-
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municipal cooperation, or even home owners associations may offer alternatives to 
exploiting economies of scale where they exist. 
 
A scenario where a local government delivers some services directly, contracts out others 
and cooperates yet with other local governments in the joint delivery of some will 
increasingly become the rule and not the exception across the world. Thus, a country’s 
legal framework should allow local governments to opt, case by case, for the institutional 
structure more adequate to their characteristics and needs.  
 
The realization that not all services offer similar potential for economies of scale, added 
to strong citizen’s preference for political accountability, should lead policy makers to 
depart from the traditional policy choice between consolidation and fragmentation, and 
include new alternatives for service delivery. In Table 4.1 we discuss the main 
advantages and disadvantages of three of these alternatives; direct service provision, 
privatization and inter-jurisdictional cooperation. 
 
In summary, the economies of scale pursued with consolidation can be reached through 
alternative avenues (Warner, 2006). Privatization and cooperation both allow additionally 
maintaining identical levels of government representation, as they focus on the provision 
of those services with potential for cost savings. On the other hand, both privatization and 
cooperation may incorporate high transaction costs into the production of services. The 
definition of contracts either among different jurisdictions or with private companies is an 
imperfect process that takes away control from the local administrations. However, as 
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they are contracts, they can be regularly re-negotiated or re-designed, a less plausible 
option in the case of consolidation. In any case, as experience in contracting accumulates 
and trust is built among the jurisdictions and with their private contractors, these 
transaction costs are likely to diminish over time. 
Table 11. Institutional Options for Service Delivery: A comparison 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
 Economies 
of Scale 
Economies 
of Scope 
Political 
Accountability 
Private Sector 
Development 
Transaction 
Costs 
Regulatory 
Costs 
Loss of Political 
Accountability 
Direct 
Provision via 
Consolidation 
Available 
depending 
on the 
service and 
the size of 
the market. 
Available 
potentially as 
it allows 
managing a 
larger 
number of 
services with 
a lower 
resource 
endowment. 
Fully retained Does not contribute 
to local private 
sector development. 
Should not 
increase. 
Should not 
increase. 
Loss of 
institutional 
representativeness. 
Greater distance 
between local 
government and 
its citizens. 
Privatization Available 
depending 
on the 
service and 
the size of 
the market. 
Available 
potentially as 
it allows 
concentrating 
resources in 
other public 
services. 
Allows 
maintaining 
level of 
political 
representation 
but loss of 
control over 
service 
delivery.  
Potentially 
contributes to the 
development of the 
local prívate sector 
if used as 
suppliers/producers. 
High initial 
contractual 
transaction 
costs. 
Diminish in 
the long run. 
High, 
especially in 
production 
process that 
are highly 
technological 
in nature. 
Potential loss of 
control over 
production and 
quality levels. 
High political 
costs if prices 
increase without 
control.  
Inter-
jurisdictional 
Cooperation 
Available 
depending 
on the 
service and 
the size of 
the market. 
Available 
potentially 
depending on 
the 
production 
method 
selected for 
the service. 
Minimal, and 
recoverable if 
agreements expire 
or are cancelled. 
None, unless 
cooperation 
leads to sub-
contracting 
to prívate 
sector.  
Potentially 
high, 
diminish in 
the long run 
as 
experience 
and trust 
builds.  
Potentially 
contributes to the 
development of the 
local prívate sector 
if used as 
suppliers/producers. 
Allows 
maintaining an 
almost 
identical level 
of institutional 
representation. 
Source: Martinez Vazquez y Gomez (2008) 
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The formation of special districts, a mostly U.S. and French phenomenon, provides and 
alternative to inter-jurisdictional cooperation, where jurisdictions create a new 
institutional body to manage and finance a particular local service. This model may be 
considered as a last stage in the evolution of inter-jurisdictional cooperation, where such 
arrangements are institutionalized to the point of creating a truly new government unit.  
 
The share of services being provided by any of these institutional mechanisms is 
expected to vary over time. As Warner (2006) argues, the share of services jointly 
provided via cooperation in the USA has been diminishing, especially in rural area over 
the last two decades, due to structural factors related to the ability of rural localities to 
compete in an increasingly market based governmental system. It is expected that similar 
forces will be at play at different stages in countries around the world, leading us to 
multiple equilibria in overall sub-national government strauctures. 
 
9. Consolidation should be incentivized, not forced.  
 
There is little rationale for forced jurisdictional consolidation unless it reaches some of 
the goals defined above. If the potential to achieve those goals exists, then policy should 
facilitate the voluntary agreement of local governments to merge. Political opposition 
from the electorate may jeopardize the success of the experience to the point of making it 
fail. 
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If the efficiency gains can reasonably be achieved via other service delivery mechanisms, 
then consolidation should be suggested as a voluntary option and incentivized from the 
higher government tiers if considered an adequate policy path. Forced consolidation may 
encounter such a popular opposition that may in fact compromise the efficiency gains 
expected from the process. As with other incentives schemes, the net positive benefits 
expected from the process of consolidation should be independent from the incentives 
provided. If only fiscal incentives make consolidation attractive, as they are likely to 
expire over time, they may not lead to substantive reform. Additional grants to assist the 
building-up of the administrative capacity of the jurisdictions merging, or for the 
construction of transport and communications infrastructure that better integrate the 
merging jurisdictions, are reasonable incentives to offer. However, the sole provision of 
short to medium term fiscal incentives, devoid of solid, long-lasting efficiency gains from 
jurisdictional consolidation in the form of economies of scale or others, is a policy likely 
doomed to fail. 
 
10. Widespread advocacy on the benefits of consolidation is required.  
 
Linked to the earlier point, voluntary consolidation, where it needs a referendum passing 
the new jurisdictional structure, requires intense and widespread advocacy to 
communicate to the population the benefits expected from the measure. If the cost 
savings expected and the improvement in service delivery are not obvious to the citizens, 
the policy will not be understood or supported. Consolidation is a policy that constantly 
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must be linked to the long term national development plans. Otherwise it may be 
perceived as a political game detached from the preoccupations of the common citizen.  
 
4.3 Conclusions 
 
The relatively low attention that such an important topic as the vertical structure of 
government has received in the public finance literature is somewhat surprising. The 
theoretical and empirical work developed in this dissertation is an attempt to contribute to 
advance our knowledge in this critical area for public sector performance. 
 
A first general conclusion drawn from our analysis is that the optimal level of 
jurisdictional fragmentation seems to be in permanent evolution across countries 
depending on the available technology for public services production, on the citizen’s 
preferences for political accountability, and on how the socio-economic, ethno-linguistic 
and geographical conditions of a given country affect the heterogeneity of local 
preferences for public goods and services.    
 
In light of such fluidity in the optimal level of government fragmentation, it is advisable 
not to assume that “cookie cutter” policies will render homogenous and solid results. In 
particular, jurisdictional consolidation processes around the world have been regularly 
advocated without an adequate analysis of their potential benefits. We have argued in this 
dissertation that there is a need to avoid dogmatism in jurisdictional reform policy and 
opt instead for a flexible array of policy options that may allow reaching in theory   
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 Private contracting, inter-jurisdictional cooperation, or the creation of special districts 
offer institutional mechanisms for service delivery that may allow reaching economies of 
scale (when they exist) without compromising local citizen’s preferences for political 
accountability. It is becoming the norm, and not the exception, that local governments 
will deliver directly some services, privatize others, and cooperate with other 
jurisdictions in the joint production of the rest. Again, the share of services provided 
under each institutional alternative is likely (and has been shown) to vary depending on 
ideological preferences of the local representatives, changes to production technologies, 
or structural factors that reduce the ability of certain localities to cooperate and lead them 
back to direct provision (Warner, 2006). 
 
This does not necessarily mean that all vertical structures of government are adequate. 
High jurisdictional fragmentation may present enormous challenges to efficient service 
delivery if it is coupled with low managerial capacity, weak tax bases, and inefficient 
political accountability processes. If the benefits from consolidation overwhelm those 
that could arguably be obtained from alternative policies, strong advocacy on those 
expected results should be undertaken, together with voluntary consolidation programs 
that are adequately incentivized. Equally, the process of new jurisdiction formation 
should be designed including both quantitative and qualitative minimum requirements in 
scale of production, fiscal sustainability, political accountability and administrative 
capacity.    
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